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The morali.t is interested in hUJlWl acts. His first task, at course, is 
to determine what calst1tutes a moral or human act. 'rom there he proceed. to 
establ1.h the diYi.ian ot moral action into the good and ertl. This task i. 
not • ..,.. Preacinding fraa the tine point. ot .1uqinC about anT calcrete act, 
it is ditticult enough merely to untangle in thoupt all of the el_ents which 
enter into the uke-up ot a buaaan act ca'lsid.ered abetractly. Be.ides the 
object ot the act its eirenastanees aut be taken into account. and 801'11 
these eire_stances the most important is the end tor which the action w •• 
pertormed.1 low it is an act or the will which bq rec.i.,..d the n._ intentio 
which brings this Jlod:1f'71ng circums'tance into tbe structve at a h,.. act. 
Con.equent17 the moralist IlU8t be especially interested in the act ot intention. 
He can be interested in it traa either of two nnpoint.. Since it i. 
, 
" it.elf an act, he 11&7 cQ181der it. coodDess or malice, and in thi. oae. he aak. 
himself what tollows it an intention is good and what follow. it the intention 
is evil. !hus the tirst ri.enrpo1nt regards tbe .0l"8.l state of the intention anel 
the Wluence this haa upon the moral state of an act. The second, howewer, 
tocuses on the enti tative state of the intention to ask what ettect this hal 
upon the moral value of an act. Then the moralist consider'S what tollows 




The con.ideration of the act of intention traa this second 'Viewpoint torws 
the content of thi. thesi.. A study ot the tirst consideration tall. outside 
it •• cope, and the cmclu.ions ot that ccosideration will be pres.ed through-
out the the.i •• 
Though the physical nature of the act of intention in all of it. three 
state. will be inve.ti,ated and detel'a1ned, the principal a1J1 ot this the.is i. 
to establish the nature of the virtual intention. What doe. it ..an to say 
that an act 1s produced 'Under the intluence ot a virtual. intention? thus runs 
the que.tion whioh was uppermost in the mind of the author .hen he began his 
search through the works of St. Tbca&&. I ..... rtb.l ••• , thi. queeticn could not 
pos.ibly be 8l1pered without a knowledge of the nature of intentim pure and 
.1aple, aucll l •• s without knowing What is .eant b7 an actual 1ntentian. lor 
oould cae t.el _tiatied that he knew clearly and distinctly tbe nature of a 
y1rtual intention as Img .. he telt Uftcertain about the physioa1 nature of 
tbe habitual intention. Th.refore this thea~. lends itself to a natural divi-
sion into three parts' a oon8iderati(l1 of the 'actual intending ot an end, a 
oCMl81deration of an habitual intentim of an end, and floa11y a ooosideration 
at a virtual intention of an end. 
The innuenoe of the babitual and virtual intentiOll upon the .orality of 
an act will aleo be 8'\udied, beeause this ... s a natural corollary to verity 
the oonc1usions _de about the physioal nature of those type. ot intention and 
to olar1t7 those .. e oonolusions. In point ot tact, 1t ..... that the oril'"" 
1nal qaeatiOll motiYating researoh into this .hole prahl_ of nnw intention 
oould not be ccmpletely .atiatied unless the aoral wnuence were al.o explain-
ed. Th. discussien, on the other hand, of the aoral 1Dtluence of the actual 
viii 
intantiCl1 could nat. be included in this stud1 for the a1a both at brev1tyand 
at unity. A. mentioned, the 'Viewpoint whioh would oon.e1der intentiQ'l according 
to it. goodne •• or badne •• ft. purpo .. l.y excluded frca th1. th.sis! to consider 
the aoral. iDtlwmc. of the actual :l.ntention would be nothing el .. , how .... r, but 
a stuclJ of the conaequcce. of a good or a bad intent1CXl GIl the .ora11t7 of an 
act-. study' which :in itself can inTolT •• ore tban & th.ai .... length expositi •• 
In addition to intention other act. ot tbe will, aamel7, volition, trui-
tion, and eleet:1on, will briefly enter the picture in order to highlight the 
nature of 1ntent1on. Attention and intensity alao, the nature of habit, of 
prud.eDoe and the other aoral T,lrtue., and a di,cllasion of the 1n~rpretative 
intention t1g\ll'8 ill the e.xplanaticm of the subject of the the.is. But, intel'-
eniDg aa 1 t II1ght be to delve turther into each <me of these topic., and un,. 
othera, their place in thi. study has to be l1a1ted. Thu., one could puraue a 
c~.on of the various act. in which the rill and the Ha.<m Idngle, such 
aa counsel, election, ccaaand, and intent1C1l:.J or ~e could. trace the growttl and 
" 
subsequent use of the tera ~terpr.tative mt.Dt1_. The varioue usage. of the 
word :int_tion offer fruitful prospects of inquir.r. A d1scU8sim of the difte 
ent type. of attention which one II1ght conceivabl,. ex.rci.e (explicit and 1m-
.1ioit, renexive and direct, etc.) is another intriguing que.ticm. All of 
the .. probl .. , if they are brought in at all, will be kept carefully in their 
proper relaticm to the subject .. tter of this thesis. 
Ho one, to the knOll'ledge of the author, hal a. :yet conducted a aaaplate 
inqu11"7 into the pqa1cal nature ot the three kind. ot intention traditional17 
calle4 actual, 'Virtual, and habitual.. Suar •• , .urel;y, _de .cae atud;y of the.e 
ix 
three, but his was not a complete one.2 In recent times there have been saae 
investigation. of Sf;. ThOllU' use of intention, taken in general. 'lb. first 
was a atudJ by B. D. Siaanin of the various meanings of the word, together with 
short explanatiClls of the difference between st. Thoaa.' early usage of the 
term and hi. later U8~ge.l Thea Ir. Andr8 Hayen, S.J., undertook a study' of 
intentional being, which pertain. to the act1"'1ty ot the intellect rather than 
to that of the will, hOlRWer, intenUon, the act of the will, .. explained at 
great length and 1t. clo.ene •• to the intention :1avol",ed 1n intelleoticm indi-
cated. h F1n&l.l;y, Dca Odon Lott:1n, O.B.B., baa 1I&de. an hiator:1cal reYielf at 
Scholutic ettort., tna Abelarcl to $t;. ThQlaa, to explain the moral effect ot 
good and bad intention •• S The treataent of the three ')'pea ot intention aa 
found in the Catholic ,.,.,l9P!ed.1a and other dioticarie., in var:toq text-
bOOka of paycholoa and ethic., and in a variev of aoral theology manual • 
.further justifie. the claia that no other author has aa yet undertaken a .. tilt-
tactor1ly complete expol1t1ca of the act ot ~tenUcn. 
The author hopeI that the follOWing chapm8 will aa tar .s lies within 
hi. cap'tenee le:rYe that t\1DCtion. 
2ne JJl:Umo 'ine BOIIin1e, d.1ep. II, seetio 4. De Bonitate et Mel!tia Huu.-
nor. iCtWll( hap. VI, •• ot10 5. Found in the Qpera OiiIilla, ed. D. it. lDar;r-
e'ii'is, i8~6J, If. · 
3B. D. S1Ilonin, O.P.t aLa notion d'p1tent10 dana l'08UYre de S. Thomas dt'quin,· ltSPT. XII (1910J, 445-~1. 
4Andr8 1:Iqen, S.J., L'Intentimmel Salon. Saint 1h ..... 2nd .d., reTised 
and corrected (Brq." 19JJi). '. 
S Odan Lott1n, O.a.I., P870hOl0eie et .orale aux Xlle et XlIIe 81'ole. 
(o.blOllZ, hlI1_, 1954), D;Jo~A.- - - . 
OHAPTER I 
DTEITIOI AID ACTUAL DTENTIOI 
... t lea, .. tra Soorate. on phUoaopher. have tOlilJld it u .. tul to b.gin an 
lDT.,U,aUcm 'b7 exaain:lng the •• aa:lna of the teN or tera, to oe u,ed. 
Th.refore it i • .fit tin, '\0 begin \he pr.sent 1nqui1'7 into the nature of inten-
tion with lea. inc.tJ.ca'lionl ot the ,8Ileral. um1ng or the tera. 
f!.rat. of all, the word. int_tiC!. .t7JI01ogicall7 ,ign1tie. a directing 
taarard, a .t:retching toward, an inolinatiOJ'l '\onrd.. !! int_d equTalently 
1 is ,qmg !!.l!!! :u. ,-.~ ~la.. Oon.equentl1' two notes are included in 
the conc.pt. the tir,t, that of a ctyn_ic diapo,itianJ the ,eecmd, that of 
direction. fbe fil"1t characteriltic provide, the clue which leada to a kn __ 
ledge of the prmcipl. of thi. act. The .ec~d, ,ipit1ed b7 the prefix ~, 
detera1A •• the ~ d1apoai'iion, Dot Ol'lll' b7 apl1citl.7 den7ins or it aotiCl1 
.....,. trc:a it. object, b1&t allO 07 japl,-1nl that this object i. separated £:rca 
the d1llaad.c pr1Bciple D,. 80M di.tmoe. 2 ru. 1JIp11caticm later will .erve 
ae a rea1nder that 1ntentian dUter, traa c.rtain other operations at the 
s •• dJnaaio prlDclpl •• 
lJil II Set., l8, 1, l 101., "Ir1tendera erd.a dicitur quasi in aJ.1ud. ten-
dere.--!,.T:;-l=II, 12, 1 en tlIteapondeo dicendua quod mten'Uo, .ieut 1p_ 
n __ .Oftai, aip1t1cat D &liquid tend.ra. II 
2Da Ver., 22, 13, obj. lSI tllTaeter .. , !ntentio est distanti, a tine, 




One might liken the act ot intention to a pursuit of a thing.) For the 
subject intending is striving to arrive at or reach 8omething. Again becauae 
of the notiCll at distance iaplied in the preposition !!!., one is not said to 
intend it the eftort to attain ia directed to the object ia.ediately I ·Per hoo 
aut_ quod dicitur in al1qu1d \endere, 1aportatur quaecBm d1stant1a Ul1us 
in quod &l1quid tenditJ et ideo quando appetltus tertur u.ediate in aJ.1qutd, 
non dicltur es .. intentio 1111118, ai ... e hoc sit t1l1i& talt1ll118, 81 ... e ait aliquid 
ad tinea ultia_J sed quando per un_ quod y1Ilt in 411ud pervenue nititur, 
1l1ia in q11Od. perTeDire nititur d1citur esa. intentio."" 
An analy8.1. ot the tU'lll itselt leads to 1et another bit of intol'll8.tion. 
lor ~cl1n1n1 or tendina tward s.ethmg can reter to t;wo tnes at subjeots. 
The action of the .,.t ~d.a toward a thiDg, a8 weU .. the mot1e ot that 
which tile agent mewes. Becauae the latter' & unitestl,. depends upon the agent t a 
80\iOl1 or action, intending ia priaarU,. the tunction ot the agent, aecondar1l:r 
that of the .obile being.S 
10ir thoqh St. Thous proceeda frOll this ::di8tinoticc to deduce the dJ'naa:l.c 
source at intention, his prinoiple Ilight serve another purpoae. lor, sinoe 
the notion or directing or being directed toward 1s general enough, it is not 
aurprising to find that the word i8 eapl07ed to expres8 various idea,. There-
fore 8eae natural 8ch_e of div1sicm will help to ola .. U1 and order those 
)IB n Sent., ibid •• "Intendere aut. in allquid est iUius potentia. 
ad quailpertlii'ii prosequi velfugere aliqu1d." !?!. ~., !!!!., 2 in centr.: 
"Praeterea, intendere est quoddaa prosequi." 




u.age.. An :in1t1al div1.10n can be made into proper application and derived 
application, where by ·proper" is aeant "in accord with the general .en.e," 
and by "'derived'" i8 meant "according to a figure of speecb. '" !hen, it one uti-
Use. tbe d:1.atinctiClD between pr1aar,y and .econdary application, where "primar'y· 
refer. to an active subject and ".eccadary'" indicates a pa.a1ve .ubject, the 
proper applicatiClD at tbe tara :1D~tiOJ1 further div1des into primary and secan-
dar;y. Thi. seh .. of div1.i_ arrange. tbe various .en ... 1n whicb st. Tb ... 
-.pl.01. the word 1I1ten'1!m. Ibat the .. san ... are will now be indicated briefly 
St. fhou.. use. in~tion in a proper and priaary sen.e to Ilea attention, 
intenait,. or intenaion,6 and tbe wl11's act ot intending. In each ot th ••• 
instanc •• tbe tel"ll 1. properly used, tor by !lttentlon i. lleant a directing to-
warde ot the oopoeolt1v. taoulty ot the soul, by intens1ClD ls lIleant a .... h_ent 
directing towards, anel by 1ntent1<lO 1. aeant the directing toward. of the 
e 
appet1t1 .... faculty ot the .oul. Sinc. each ot the three inTolve. the not1Cl1l ot 
an act1v. aubject, the applicat10n in all 1.~al.o primal'7. 
lrat_t1~ is used 111 a proper bat .eoaadtii-y sen.e when 1t .ign1t1e. 
1n.truIIlental aot1on, or inatruaental V1rtu • .7 'or here a direction towards 1. 
1ndicated, but the .ubjeot 1. cmsidered &8 a pa •• 1ve .UBject. So, tor example, 
the saw 11'1 the hand. at a carpenter po ••••••• an intention, but only inasaucb 
as 1t 1s being wielded by the am and hand ot the ca1'1*lter. 
fhe d.rived application occurs when intent10n .tand. tor that which i. 1:0 
6Ct • Ha,-en, pp. 48, 161-164, 170-174J S1acn1n, pp. 447-448. The former 
ae •• to take intension and intensity as two specif1cally different uaages, 
but the two teras are related a. the ooncrete and the ab.tract are related. 
7Bayen, pp. 48, 167, Simonin, pp. 448-4,1 .. 
4 
some W&7 the object or an incl1natiCl1, rather than in inclinatim itself. Under 
thi. usage bela'll tho .. cases in which St. ThOJlAB speak. of cognoscitive epecies· 
and the purpo.e, or goal, ot the .. U1.9 'or the intentional specie. do not 
receiTe their name becauae thel are inclined to sanething el.e.10 lor doe. an 
author's intention in writing a book incline to seaething else, rather, it 
draws OIl the author b7 its appetibUit7. 
fbi. the us is interested directly in atud71ng m17 ene of ~e.. s1% dif-
terent types of intention &. St. 1'h .... coneeived thart. Yet allot the others 
will increa •• 1B mtell1gibil1t7 as a rePl.t at the restricted ettort, 811d two 
ot the, attentien and inten.icz, approach 80 near17 the act of :1ntentiClll that 
the7 aqt eater the oc.p1ete p.,-oho1og1oal pict.v.re of that act. 1'8e 1Wt&:1ncter 
of the present ohapter will be clevot.ecl to expla1nlllg thla aet of intending b7 an 
anal7.i. ·01 st. 1b.aus' deaoription of 1t. 
Be expres.17 deala with the .. tter in three .. orks which range orer a large 
port.1on of his writ:b:lC career. The OQlllentaq ~ ~ Sm'tellce., .. r1:tten traa 
, 
l2S4 to 1156, fOrlll1alates his fun eli_uss1m Of the subject. U. NtU'D8 to 
the act ot 1ntentim in the D18J>!ted. Question!!! 1'l'U~, Which are dated at the 
8Ha7en, pp. 111-189, SiJaQllm, pp. 456-460. 
9lfa7en, p~ 48; he diacems enough difterence between "design, purpose- cd 
"thoqht. senae ( .. hat the author .. ant. to s..,.)- to aake of th_ .eparate appU-
cation. of intention. 1'h1. seema _ unnecesa&r7 retin __ t. In II Seat., 38, 
hp. textus expiiins' "Intent10, proprie loquendo, act_ YOluntat1s 8Iii1t1cat, 
ut dict'Oll en; sed tin .. nm sign1ticat n1si aa'terlallter nOlllen ... tur, ut 
scilicet s .. tv intentict'" pro re intenta, sicut et tide. nmitur pro re cred1-ta.-
lODe. fer., 21, ), ad S I "(el. dicitur. 'Finis prior .st in intentione, • 
1ntentio-s.itur pro actu mentis, qui est intendere. Cum aut. comp&raaua 
intenti<mea bGni at veri, intent10 sUlllitur pro ratione quaa eign1t1cat defini-
t10J unde aequiToca accipitur utrob1que. tt 
period. tJ'Oll 12$6 to 1259. )'!nally, in the two 7HZ'll 1269 and 1270, he 1 ___ 
riaed and ordered hia thouant in the f;1Jaa :oiecnmdae ot the !!!!:! theolOlica.ll 
The COIIIIl81tarz &aka in two article. whether intention il an act at the w1ll, and 
whether the Will in oo.e and the a .. e act 111:1.11. the end and the .eana to ~. end. 
The Ilj,aputed Queationl oanuder alaoat the identical two qUltion., except that 
the 18Cond il rephraaeel tbua' -Doe, the will ill the .... Ilotian intend the end 
and 'rill the llean • .,,,12 The s.u inquir.. about th'e point •• whether intent1an 
il the intellect' a act or the rill'l, whether it ia 01117 ot the last end, 
whether a man oan intend two thines at once, whether intention ot the end 11 the 
.... act aa the vollt1. of a meana, aid whether ut.lt1cn baloaga to brutea. 
All three looa"ian" then, begill with the t_claaental qu.lt1Cl1l, "Ie 1nten-
tien aD. act ot the will, or nott- The worela ot the ~ give • clear an_I'" 
- [IJntentio, 11cut ipa. ncaen aonat, a1gn1t:1cat in allq1l1<l t_der.. In aliquid 
aut_ tencl1t et actio aewentil, et motu .ob111.. Sed hoc quod motue aobi11l in 
aliquid tend1t, ab actione Iloyenti, proced1t.~Un. intenUo priao et priDc1pa-
, 
liter p4tJ"tinet aci iel quoc! aoyet ad t1DaI.l uncle:: cl101aua aroh1tectol"., et an_ 
praeo1p1ent., aoyere .uo iaper.1oalloa ad 1el quocl1p .. utendi". folunt .. 
11The datinc here i. a. found in Wah' a chroDolol1, C1.en in VerDon J. 
Bourke'l lntroductioo. :!:2 !h! Workl !!.!!. J.baau Aquinaa (lew Yom, 1948), 
pp. xii-xiii. 
12 In the atandard editionl conlulted, the title to the article (.E! !!!:., 
22, 14) il given all "Utrua 'Volmtaa eodem motu velit tinem et intendat ea quae 
sunt ad tin_.· fhat thie stat_ct ooo.ta:ina an accidental inver.ion at 'Verb. 
il clear trca the entire text of the article, where the question really die-
cusled 11 ae tranalated above. The phruiD, in the other locationl' ·lJtrlD inte: l0-
tio tini. lit 1_ actus Cllll Tol_ute eius quod eat ad tinea,· (.!.!., I-U, 12, 
I.), -lItr_ 't'oluntaa mo et eodea act. ".lit tin_ et ea quae 8mt ad tin_," 




aut_ movet canes aliu Tires aDiIlae ad finem, ut aupra habit. e.t. Unde aani-
fest- est quod m\eD.tio proprie eat actus Tolunta.tis.·13 Here the proof is 
taken frca the will ta prilll&17 role, it. prillac:r, Dong .an'a powers as the 
source of actiCll1.14 The et,.olog1oal roots ot the word have directed the in-
quir7 to SQle dynamic principle. III the h\ll8n .uppos1te, this clear~ de.cribe. 
the capacity andflJDCtion of the will.15 
The COlB8l1~ otfers the .... explanation. For again the 'Y817 nae ot 
thia act points out the pCIIJer to which it pertaiDs. Intendina seaething belong. 
to the a.a faculty whioh dicta\ea tllght and pursuit. Bow which tacult,. i. 
responsible when we nee or pursue ... tbing! Cena1nl.7 not the speculative 
intellect. It, heM_er, ;rev. an_v that the practical intellect dictatea night 
or pv.uit, s.h a replT doea aot expra •• the truth ex&etq. Jlo, tha practical 
:lnteUect judee. the actrisabU:i.tr of eithar action, but it 'belongs to the 
appetite or w111 to execute Webt or purauit .16 
the .. a cCIlcluaiOll to the question, but- f ... a diUerent point of new, 
, 
is reached in the E! Yer1tate, in which the ar&-ent proceeds in teruat the 
object of the intentim. The object is the good which is an end. But lood i. 
alao the proper object of the will. Thua an act (intention) and a power (the 
will) have the ea. object. ICIIJ, .ince a pCIIJer ia related to an object 01117 
13!.!_, ill.!!. 
14Aap17 proven in other 1ocat1cmsl e. g., ~.!., I-II, 9, 1. 
15,!?! !!l., 22, 12 c. "Sed movere per 1Iodum cauaae agentis eat v01\111tatis, 
et nOll 1ntel1ectua ••• actus voluntatia e.t quaedam !nelinatio in aliquid, 
nOD aut. actus 1n1lellectua. Incl1natio aut_ .at diepoaitio moventie 
aecunda quod e:ttic1ene 8cmat." 
16 ~ II !!!!!., )8, 1, 3 eol. 
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through its act, it the two agree in their object, the act in question belongs 
to that power. Theretore one must conclude that intention is an act of the 
will.17 st. Thomas is not raising here a completely new argUlllentJ in an argu-
ment to the contrar,y preceding his reply in the COllllUDta!7 he already had retel"-
red to the same point.1S But in this passage he has seen tit to expand the idea 
lor has it been cCIIlpletely taken for granted that the object of the in1& n-
tion is an end. True enoug.'l, a whole tradition had preceded St. Thomas in which 
philosophers used intention to describe the inclination of the Will to an end, 
and in which they measured the aoral goodness of an intention partly from the 
end.19 It 11&1' have been in the context ot this tradition that st. Theaa. 
formulated his division or the acts of the wUl to be considered in Questions 
light to Seventeen in the !.!:!:!! Secundae. 20 HoweTer, in his ?ommentaq !!!. !h! 
Sentences he has undertaken some justification tor this common or traM tional 
understanding of the word. There he begins with what the preposition !!! im-
plie., n8llely, sCllle distance fram the object: to which something tends J on this 
basis one cannot properly be said to int.end unless one seeks t.o attain sOllething 
through another thing which one wms. An intention is made ot that object one 
seeks to attain, not or that which one immediately wills. Since the immediately 
desired object i. serTing as a. m.eans to the other, the latter is an end. -Id 
17 v: De er., 22, 13 c. 
--18~ II Sent., 3B, 1, 3, 2 in centro 
19Lott1n, PSlchologie .!! Korale, IV, 309-486. 
20S•'1' ., I-U, 8, prologus: "Actus autem yoluntatis in finem videntur esse 
tres • :-:- ." "They seem to be three, tI as it to say that analysis and tradi-
tional doctrine have ~ uncovered more nor less. 
autem quod est propter " bonum et voli tum, est tinis •• 21 Thus intention 
designates an act ot the will for an end. 22 
8 
This is not to be understood as saying that an act or intention must look 
to the last end in &ll instances. Otherwise how explain the diversity of inten-
tiona fOmld among men? No, there are two kinds of ends for the will. One end, 
called the last end, is arrived at when the 1Il01oioo of the will is completed. 
The other type ot end is reached at the caaple1iion ot a part ot the total 
motion. 23 Thus God is the last end of every .an in the universe; but each also 
haa his own particular end to desire.24 
Consequently intention is always of an end. though not necessarily always 
ot the last end. .\:Jut other acts of the will also bave the end as their object J 
intention Iluat not be contu.aed with these. Bet ore _rking the difference be-
tween intention, volit1cn, and fruition, however. another important element in 
the act of intention must be examined. It belongs to the essence of the full 
act, and without it the will's act of inten~g an end cannot take place. ~'or 
intention is Mactua voluntatis in ordine ad rationem" J M[n] on tamen est actus 
voluntatis absolute, sed in ordme ad ratianaa. ft25 
21.§..!., I-lI, 8, 2 c. 
22~ II !!!!!., 38, 1, 3 sol. 
23!.!., I-lI, 12, 2 c. For St. ThOll ... the ultimate, or last, end was not 
distinguished into ultimate amply and ultimate relatively, as is otten done by 
authors todq. 
241!! n ~., 38, 1, 1 sol.: .. (8]icut rerum omnia linUS est finis ult!mus, 
scilicet Deus, ita et vol\D'ltatum omnium est unus ultlmus finis, soilicet DeUS) 
nibilominus tamen sunt alli tines proxiJai. u 
25 E! !!t., 22, 13 c. 
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The Commentarz briefly explain. and proves this requisite role ot reaacmJ 
the text in the E! Veritate enlarges on this point to the extent that the entire 
Bepl)" is cCXlcerned with this aspect) the Summa seems to presume that the matter 
needs no further explanation or proot. Fran the fact that the will tends to the 
end through .aaething else which i. directed to the end, says St. !rhanaa in the 
Canmentag, intentim itaplie. in its lIeaning an ordering of me thing to another 
The function of ordering, however, pertain. to the intellect. 26 Thus intention 
i. not an act ot the will absolutely, but as subordinated to and ordered by 
reasoo.27 
An ordering ot one thing to another is essential to intentiOn. To intend, 
again, is to tend fran what one w111s to .omething else a. to an end. The end 
is that to which the means are refered; in willing the Ileans, the will also is 
referred to the end. But what arranges this reference of means to end! 
Nothing else but the intellect, which sees that a certain thing, to which other 
things lead, is a good. Therefore when the ~ill begin. to act, its object 1, 
some .ort of ordered object. Since ordering does not .tea trom the will '. 
nature, but trom the intellect's, the act of intending proceed, trom a will 
which is guided by reason.28 
26 8 
.!!! II ~., 3 , 
27 In II Sent., 38, 
- -
1, 3 sol.,; !! !!t., 22, 13 c • 
1, 3 ad 5. 
28E! !!r., 22, 1.3 c I "Cum ena voluntas moveatur in SUUDl obiectua sibi 
propositum a ratione, diversimode movetur, secundum quod diversiBode sibi pro-
pooitur. Unde, C'Ulll ratio propanit sibi aliqu1.d ut absolute boo.um, voluntas 
Dlovetur in 1l1ud absolute,; at hoc est velle. Cum autem proponit sibi &l1quid 
sub ratione boni, ad quod alia ordinentur ut ad tin_, tmc tend! t :In illud 
cum quodam. ordine, qui :lnvenitur in actu vo1untatis, non secundum propriam 
natura, sed secundum exigentiam rations is • tt 
10 
This funotion of the intellect, obvious as it seems and casually as it may 
be present.ed, assumes great importance infuture disoussion. The explanation of 
the natures of habitual and of virtual intention will d.epend a great deal on a 
closer insight into the role of reasOll in the will's act of intending. Further 
inspection of this fmction will be worth while. 
iirst or all, "the intellect has the ability to order a number of things 
into sane unity. The given in this case is the fact that men do understand a 
number of things at the same time, a phenomenon which is impOssible unless one 
intelJigible species, containing the plurality of objects obscurely, WE.ll'8 in-
fOMing the intellect. For the intellect to know two things at once, it has to 
know the two as related, or under the aspect of related beings.29 
As a consequence of this capacity of the intelleot the will al,o can be 
inclined to two or more things at once.. Thus the will can desire a meana for 
itself (i.e., not as Ii means but as a thing) and an ,end for itself. Or it can 
desire the means and the end at the same t1m~, willing the means for the sake 
of the end. When it acts in this manner, its 1'Il.0tion doe.not stop with the means 
and th Ell resume i te momentum toward the end, as th ough there were here two acts. 
One Ca'ltinuous motion carries the will trail its original point of reat through 
the means and up to the e.nd • .30 
) 
It is clear then that the intelleot ordera both the means to the end, and 
the will also to the end.)l The two arrangements are not made, however, in 
29 ~.!., I, 12, 10; 58, 2; 85, 4J ~ II ~., 38, 1, 4 sol. 
30 I ~ II ~., .38, 1, 4 sol. and ad 2) !.!., I-I, 12, 3 and 12, 4. 
31S.T., I-II, 12, .3 ad 21 flSed in quibuBdam intellectus ord1nans appetitlDll 
in finei e,t conjunctuB ipsi appetitui. tt Cf. also In II ~., 38, 1, .3 sol. 
11 
the same way, as is )mom from a general acquaintance with the operations ot the 
intellect and its relation to the will. The intellect 'works with I t 'deals with 
the intelligible aspects of things, learning of things as they are, and, finally 
becoming one with the real existing beings through a dynamio intentional identi-
fication. Thereupon the will can desire what is intentionally represented in 
the intellect. Since the will and intelleot belong to the same sUPPosit,l2 and 
both Will and intellect are capable of reflection, the will haa the capacity to 
desire thoae things which exist intentionally in the intellect.l3 '!hus by can-
ceiTing the end the intellect can propose the end to the will. By seeing a 
means and its end the intellect can propose this composite ordered object to the 
rill. In this manner, then, the intellect orders the means to the and and the 
will to the end, tor the will follows the apprehensiCil or reasm)4 
It was stated above I -By seemg Ii means and its end the intellect can pro-
pose this composite ordered object to the will.· Two aspects of the operation 
of the intellect mU8t be noted and diatinguiehed in this stat_ent. One, the 
32De Ver., 22, 13, ad 7* "Ron tamen oportet quod intendere et velle sint 
actus ern.deii potentiae, ouius est cognoecere, sed eiusdem suppositi t noo enim 
proprie dicitur cogn08cere vel intendere potentia aliqua, sed suppo8itum per 
potentiam.- . 
33cr• B! Ver., 22, 12 cJ S.T., I, 82, 4; I-II, 9, 1 and 3. The intentional 
aspects of intellection descriDed in this paragraph should not be confused with 
the act of intention of the will. For an extended analysis of the intellect' 8 
intentional actiVity, the reader is referred to Fr. Hayen's book cited in the 
Introduction of this paper. 
l4ne Ver., 22, 4 Ot "Quod autem aliquid determinet sibi inclinationem in 
finem, non- poteat contingere niai cognoacat finem, et habitudinem fini8 in ea 
quae Sl.mt ad finemt quod est tantlllll rationis. Et ideo tali8 appetitu8 non 
determinatua ex al1quo al10 de necessitate, sequitur apprehensionem rationi8J 
unde appet1tua rationalis, qui voluntaa dicitur, est alia potentia ab appetitu 
8enaibUi." 
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intellect 8ees ! ~an! !!!!! .!:!!~. '!'hat is, it orders into one composite ob-
ject. Two, the intellect !!.!!. That is, the intellect is nttending to the ob-
ject; it is paying attention. The first of these two aspects is considered 
here. Later, attentim, which is a propc.rty of any cooscious act of the intel-
l1ect, will be considered. It need only be Observed here that ordering necessa-
rily is performed attentively, but that attention can be given without the 
intellect necessarily ordering. ThuB there is a distinction between the two 
aspects. 
This mutual relation or intellect and will was an important problem in St. 
Thomas' eyes. The a.rticle on 1ntenticn in the p! Veritate seems at pains to 
emphasise the pOint. One could easily presume that the intellect's function in 
~he act of intention is finished when it proposes to the will an intentional re-
presentat10n of, the thing to be willed. But knowledge of this sort must precede 
every act of the will, and so intention seems no different in this respect traza 
other acts of the will. St. Thomas foresaw '!Ihe difficulty and answered it)' 
His reply in the ~ Veri tat! has already been 'seen, namely, that something which 
is proper to reason appears in the act itself of the w11l. The act of the w111 
is ordered; it t~d$ to its object with a certain order.36 
St. 1'hanas goeBon to explain this certain type of reason-directed order. 
He notes the difference between active relation and passive relation.; an active 
relation to an end is the function of realm, tor reason orders and directs} to 
the will belcngs the function of being ordered to the end, and 80 its relation 
35~ ~.r., 22, ]J, obj. 3. 
36~., corpus; of. t..he quotation on p.9 above. 
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is passive.37 Since intention i. properly an act of the will, it 1s the passive 
relation that i8 found in intention. 
At this juncture it is po.sible to witness a development in the theory of 
st. Thcaas. ~eroas in the E.!. Veritate he verge. frequently on the notion of 
intention as an act not only of the will but als:> of the intellect, he does not 
do 1I10re than repeat constantly that, although something of the intellect is pre-
sent in the act of intending, nevertheless intention is an act ot the will. On 
the me hand he will say, tI Intending is an act of the will in subordination to 
reason, tI and tithe Will has a type of act w'nioh belmgs to it inasmuch as the 
influence of reason is left in the will, n and "there appears in the act of the 
w111 what is proper to reason,"38 and "nothing prevents a single act trca. be-
longing to both rea.on and will, to one immediately, to the other mediately. fiI 
On the other hand, he hopes all this will be satiefactorily explained by the 
difference between the active and the passive relatiClls. In the ~ Secundae 
of the !!!!! his explicit statement once aca;1n goes no tarlher than to say the 
intention is an act of the Will. But, as for"the influence of the reason left 
in the aot of the wUl, and the subordination to reason, and the other desorip-
tions ot the role of reason whioh are found in the E! _V_er_i_t_a_t_e, there is no 
mention made. At least three time. St. Thomas says the ordering ot reason 
Erece?es in saae way the aot of the will, but that is all he aay • .39 In each 
37De Ver., 22, 1), ad lJs ·(R)elatio in finem activa eat rationis= eius enim 
est reterre1n tinem; sed relatio passiva poteat esse ouiuscumque direoti vel 
re1ati in finem per rationem J et sio poteat 'esse voluntatis. Et hoc modo 
relatio in finem. pertinet ad intentionem. fI Cf. also ~., ad 10 and ad 1.4. 
)8 ~., ad 3. 
39 S.T., I-II, 12, 1 ad 1; ad 3; 3 ad 2. 
case he 1s indicating that what 1s ordered 1s the will t 8 object, but not the 
w111 t s act. Thus he has changed his original picture of the will' 8 act a8 hav-
ing in it saaething of the intellect. Now his picture portrays the intellect's 
function as presupposed to the act of the W111.40 
Comparison often serves to clarify uncertainty and to verity understanding. 
Since all oJ: the elements essential to the will's act of intending an end have 
now been delineated, the task of cOilparing thia act with other acts of the will 
regarding the end for the purpoaes of enlightenment and verification presents no 
problem. low the question hinted at previously can be raised again and answer-
ed: "Sow does intending differ fraa voliticm and fruition?" Atter this has been 
dul1 settled, a p08sible source of contUsion, namely, the aot of eleotion, will 
be taken up and explained. 
st. Thomas indicates very clearly the difference between volition and in-
tention. In the former the end is willed immediately, in the latter soae medi ... 
intervenes between the will and the end. ·~spondeo dicendum, quod actus volun-
tatis potest fieri in finem dupliciter. Vel immediate in ips ... f1nem .... et 
talis actus proprie dicitur voluntas finis ut velle bea.titudinem. Alio modo 
fertur actus in finea mediante eo quod est ad finem, et hoc proprie dicitur 
40The temptation is strong to apportion to intention St. Thomas' explicit 
dootrine on election, on use, and on oomnand, as stated in the Prima Secunda~. 
What he explains about these three, eapecially election, seems to fit intention 
also, particularly after one has read .!!!. Veritate, 22, 13-15. Yet, the treat-
ment of intention in I-II, 12, 1-5, is strikingly silent about the notion of 
composite act; nor is there any im~ication of it. For st. Thomaa, in the opin-
ion of this author, intentioo remains a simple act of the will, and thus another 
differenoe marks it fran the cClllposite act of electioo. For a discussion of 
cCllllposi te act in st. Thaua the r~er is referred to the fine article by 
George P. Klubertanz t S.J.;"'l'he Unity of Human Activity,· !!!! Modern Sehoo~, XXVII (January 1950 J , 75-103. 
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intendere fin .... 41 Again, the act of the wUl in the first case is said to be 
of the will absolutely; in the second case the act of the w11l has scaeth1ng in 
it which is proper to reason. 42 lor example, the un who desires health or 81J.Y 
other thing is said to be wUl1ng absolutely, and his act is volition. But if 
he desire" to attain health through sanetldng els., then his act 1s intentim.4) 
Should, however, the w1ll rest in the aequisitiOl'l of an end, the act of the 
will is called fruition. Consequently fruition does not imply an ordering, as 
intention does, but absolute repose in the end. Further, fruition properly is 
had of the last end, whereas intention is of any end.44 
These few stat_ent" IlUffice to prevent confusion between intent:tcn and 
either voliticn or fru1ticn. Since intent1cn not only regards the end, but 
necessarily includes 80me consideration ot means, it will be helpful for clari-
ty's sake to explain also the difference between intention and election. 
11ection, or chOice, naturally occupies an important place in the study ot 
human acta, and consequently there is no dea,rlh of passages in St. Thomas' works 
dealing with this operation of the will. The "aim at present is not to sketch 
the essence and properties of the act, but only to compare and oontrll8t it with 
4l]n II Sent., )8, 1, 5 sol.;8180, ibid., 3 sol.; ~.!., I-II, 12, 1, ad 4; 
8, 2 c;l!! Ver e , 22, 13 c and 15 c (ad fin.). 
42~ II ~., 38, expo textus; 38, 1, ), ad 5; !! Ver., 22, 13 0 (ad tin.) 
43§.!o, I-II, 12, 1 ad 4; E! Ver., 22, 14 e (ad fin.). 
44s.'1'., I-II, 12, S ad 2: "(1jruit.10 non importat ordinationem alicuius in 
aliquid'; siout intentio; sed abaolutam quietea in tine.- .ill.2., 11, 4 ct "Quod 
ergo est si.mp11c1ter ult1m.um, in quo aJ.:l.quid delectatur sicut in ultimo fine, 
hoc propria dioitur fructusl at. eo propria d1citur aliquis frui •••• Non aut. 
quiascit (voluntatis aotus] simpliciter nisi in ultimo: quia quandiu aliquid 
expectatur, motu. voluntatis remanet in suspenso, l10et iam ad &liquid per-
Tenarit." Cf. also 12, If ad 4. 
Ithe act of intention. The principal d1!ference Ues in their respective objects 
lintention is of the end, election i. of the aean. to an end.4, The pr1ncipal 
lsimilarity between the two 11es in their reliance on the ordering of reason, 
~hough in choice that which 1sproper to reason-ccapanng and ordering- makea 
~laction a caaposite &ot.46 Whereaa in intentica the Ileana are ordered to the 
end, in the act or ch01ce the meana are ex:> mpared one w1th the other, or are 
ordered one betore the other. 4 7 Alter a man has tntended a certain end, it 
there is more than just a aingle meana tor the end he w1l.l. next have to we1gh 
the means and prefer one to the other. Thus intent10n precedea choice, and need 
not alwqa be tollowed by choice. In certain instances, though, an aot of the 
will could be cons1dered either as ch01ce or aa intent1on, depending on one's 
point at view. 48 However, enough haa already been sketched to show that the" 
two acts of the will ordered by the intellect are olearl,. distinct and ought 
not to be contused. 
4, De ~., 22, lS cJ 22, 13, ad 9J In II ~., 38, 1, 3, ad ,J )6, exp. 
tutus T"et ideo in III Ethic •••• 11) J !-=!., 1-11, 1), 3 c. 
46ne Ver., 22, 1, c. "Est taman elactio actus voluntatis non absolute, sed 
in ord1De acr rationa, eo quod in electione apparet 1d quod est propriua ratiO-
nia, acilieet conferre UIllD. alteri, vel praeferre." Cf. alao. !!! II ~., 24, 
1, 2 801. and ) sOl.} !.!., I, 63, 3 CJ I-II, 13, 1 o. 
47~ Ver., 22, 13, ad 16. «(I]ntentio eat actus voluntatia 1n ordine ad 
rationem ordinant8ll ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem ip8UJlJ sed electio eat actus 
voluntatis in ordine ad rationem cOllparantem sa quae aunt in finem ad invieem.t 
et propter hoc intenUo et elactio d1fferunt." 
48!.!e, I-II, 12, 4 ad 3, n[M)otus qUi eat unua aubiecto, potest ratione 
differre secundua prineipium et linam, ut aseensio 8t descensio, siout dicitur 
in III Phlsic. Me igitur inquantUII motu8 voluntatis fer1iur in id quod est ad 
finED, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio. J(otU& aut_ voluntati& qui fer-
tur in tinem, secundum. quod aequin tur per ea quae aunt ad t1nem., vacatur inten-
tio. Cuius aignUII est quod intentio finis t"sse poteat, et1_ nondwn dete1"l1ina-
tis his quae sunt ad fin., quorum eat electio." 
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To 8\DDIIlB.rize aDd at the same time corroborate the exposition given it will 
be profitable to consider other texts bearing on the topiC, text. drawn fran 
locations other than the principal three. 
Firat the notion of intention was found to signify in general aome tendency 
or inolination. Indioating this general meaning are auch passages aau "Ion au-
t_ intentio et appetitua materiae est ad privation .. sed ad fO%'llU.,,49 and 
fI (O)_e &gens habet aliqua intention_ et desideriUII finis,·SO in which the 
conjoined w:orda !pp!ti te and desire seem aerely to repeat the _.e idea (auch as 
one might praiae "the peace and quiet of the countrT'). 
:Nut it was seen that tntentim is an act of the will, which is proved frcaa 
the fact that its object is the end. "Intentio aut. eat aotua voluntatis, ut 
supra habit. est. quia intentio .st de fine, qui est voluntatis obiectUDl."Sl 
-'.oes8e est igitur dicere, quod in productione oreaturarum a Deo ait aliquis 
finis intentua. Jitvenitur autem agere propter tin. et volunta. et natura, sed 
aliter et aliter. Natura enia • • • non pot"st .ibi prustituer. fin_, nee se 
in .tina movere aut ordinare vel dirigere; quod quid_ competit agenti per 
voluntata, cuius est intelligere et tinem et omnia praedicta. lhde agens per 
voluntat. sic agit propter tin_, quod prae8titu1t aibi finem, et leipa'" quo-
dammodo in fin_ movet, IUS actione. in ips. ordinando. ,,52 
But the will does not produce an act of intention completely by itself, and 
49c•o., III, 4 (in med.). 
--So r:! l!! I!!!!!,., ).." 1, 1 sol. 
Sl!e.r., II-II, 180, 1 c. 
S2Ile Pot., ), lS c. 
--
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it requirea the assisting functions ot the intellect, both to have an object to 
rwill, and to will an object that ia ordered. Further, it was said that the in-
teraction of will and reaeon at •• from their roots in a common supposit. Re-
garding theee three pOints, st. Thoma. says: tiDe agentibus auteRI per intellectua 
non eat dubiUlll quin agant propter fin_: agunt enim pre.econcip1entes in intel-
leotu id quod per actionem consequuntur, et ex tali praeconceptione agunt; boc 
enUl .st agere per intellect.· ,53 -Manitestu est aut_ quod l'atio quodammodo 
volvntatem. praeoedit, et ordinat actum e1u •• inquantum scil1cet vol\Bltaa in au_ 
obiect_ tendit eecundUll ordinem l'at1on1., eo quod via apprehendva appet1t1vae 
suum. obiectUIII repraesentat tf ,54 and a[QJuia actua voluntat1s at rat ionia supra 8e 
inv1cem. possunt terri, pl"OUt ecilicet ratio ratioc1natur de volendo, et volunt ... 
vult rat10cinariJ contingit aetum vollll'ltat1. praeven1r1 ab actu ration1., et e 
COllVel"SO. It quia virtu. prioria actua reaanet in actu aeqUClt1, contingit 
quandoque quod est aliquia actus voluntatia. secundum quod manet virtute in ipso 
aliquid de actu ration!a, ut dictum eat de UIJU .t de elect1one, et e cmverao 
aliquia eet actus rationia, secunda quod virtute .net in ipso a1iquid de actu 
vol untatis •• 55 
,inally, through ccmpar1am and contrast at. Thoma. clarH'iea the differ-
ences between intention and the other acts of the 1i:1ll, both those who.e object 
is the end and one in partiCular whose object i8 the Ileana. Fol' the prior cea-
53£_.2_, III, 2 (Adhuc. Ome agens). 
54 !.!., 1.11, 13, 1 c. 
55Ibid., 17, 1 c. 
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parison the following passage, treating of the passions of the cc:ncupisoible 
appetite, will be useful because it illustrates the direct parallel in a lower 
appetite of the acts of the higher appetite. ·PriJIla ergo 1mm.utatio appetitus ab 
appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est allud quam complacentia appetibilis; et 
ex: hac caaplacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desideriun, et ultimo 
quies, quae est gaudium ... 56 The follOWing passage indicates the basic ditferenc~ 
between 1Dtending and choosing. "Respondeo dicendum, quod volmtas dupllc1ter 
potest cma1derari$ vel secund\D. quod eat intendens, prout in ultimum fin_ fer-
tur, Tel secundum quod est eligens, prout tertur in objectllBt proximum, quod in 
fiuem ult1m'UII ordinatur. ftS7 
The preceding review of texts has summarized brietly the main el_ants 
necessary for a proper understanding of what it is to intend. Hence one might 
say that all of the essential notes, all that one needs in order to formulate 
a clear definition of intention, have been proposed 'thus tar. However, since an 
act ot the will i., in its physical reality,~ a very definite activity, it, like 
other act. of the hUlll8l'l soul, is capable of twO types of circumstantial JIloditi-
cation. The first type springs trOJll the operation of the intellect, the second 
derive. trail the motion of the will. Both together modif;y wery act of inten-
tion; both can 80 ruse with the act of intention and with each other as to def;y 
separate identification within that act; both often pa88 under the name inten-
~. Furthermore, and most important, the element of attention must neceasaril,. 
enter the picture of intentioo at this pOint. For up t111 now the entire aim of 
56 Ibid., 26, 2 c. 
-57 l!. n !!!!!., 40, 1, 2 801. 
20 
this chapter has not been achieved. A full explanation of an actual 1ntenticm 
has not yet been seen, for the attention which is a property of the conscious 
activity of the intellect and which consequently accompanies the ordering of 
means to end is lfOrthy of salle diacussioo.. i'or all these reasons, then, it will 
be neceS8a17 to continue the explanation of the act of intention witha conside:r-
atiCil of attention and intensit1' .. 
Attention, for present purposes, allows of five stat_ents. First of all, 
attentiw in man 1s an activity ot .. property of, and consequence of the opera-
tion of the cognoscit1ve powers, eapecial.ly the intellect. When a man is paying 
attenUw, &8 we say, to saae object, he 1s not willing it nor desiring it. He 
is knOlling it, and mowing it in act. That is, his cognitive faculties are 
operating on that object conscio\181r. Because man's intellect is limited in its 
operation to a single object, a man can attend on11' to one thing or Ullr things 
related into a unity.58 As proof of thiS, the intellect must turn its attenticn 
from sensible activity to busy itself' with more intellectual pursuits. as, for a 
ca&1lDn example, in the case of musicians, whoa. attention is directed to the mu-
sic and not to their fingera.S'9 Also, since it is the intellect that attends, 
a man' 8 efforts to learn, to m81loriz., to contemplate, to reason, and 80 on, can 
be hindered by anything distracting or otherwise impeding the use or the 1ntel';" 
180",.60 
Secondly, the intellect and the other eognoscitive powers are ordinarily 
58 B!!.!!., 13, 3 c. 
59 ~ .. , obj. 10 J .!!! IV ~ .. , 15, 4, 2, 5, obj. 2. 
60 S.T t , I-II, 37, 1 c and ad 3J 77, 1 c; JJ, J, ad 3. 
--
21 
~O¥'.d to attend b7 the will, but an object. can in carta1n c1rcuaetance. at'beet 
the cOgDoec1t.1 .... poIIers eo st1"Ongl1 t.hat the w1ll' a cmtrol 1. neutralized. The 
!will t. role 1. illuatrated. by the tut that a un can have an hab1 tual knowledge 
or the seience at geaaet", and yet not attend to thia knowledge at all.6l On 
the other hand, a man actuall7 can be .0 engroaaed 111 a paniona'e aetiY1ty that 
hi. will C8lU'lot divert the attent1cz at the intellect rraa it. object.62 'lb. 
rollowmg text d_matrat •• Icme at the correlat1.,.e .t1Inot1ou ot intellect and 
iwUl in thia act of attent1on. -Via cognoacltiva non copoacit al:I.quid actu n1al 
adal t intctio I unde et phantaaata in organa conaervata interdQa non actu 1m&-
g1n_ur, quia 1I1tent10 nm tertur ad ea. awetitua eniJI al1ae potentia. in act_ 
!movet in agent1bus per vol-untat.. -ulta igltuI" ad quae aiJaul intentio non rer-
tur, nm .unu intU8II1lr. Quae aut. oportet aub una intentione cadere, oportet 
saul .... intellecta. qu1 .,iJI cOllparat1an. cluorwa can.iderat, intent10na 
ad 'd1'WqUe dingit at eiJlul intuet1ll' utruJDque. "6) 
Thirdly, jUlt aa, properly epeald.q, it:. .. a8 t.h. whole soul that inclin .. 
'. 
toward, or intends, .0 too it is the whole .oul. tbat 8OIlehow becoue in ... ol .... d in 
attending .md intending at onea. So .uch BO, tbat in describing the phenounon 
st. '.lbaaa. scut:l.!le. does not try to Jl&ke the two act. olearly di.t1nct., and 
61Ib~d.. 77, 2 c t "Quod aut_ homo DC. cons1deret in particular! 1d quod 
hab1tual.1ter so1t, quandoque quidea cont1ngit ex solo der"tu intentimia. put.a 
ClB homo ac1en. geaaetriall, nen intendit ad oonaiderandlM geClletr1ae CQl011181o-
~ •• , quae .tatim in prampt.u bab.t conaiderare. tf Alao, B!. !!la, ), 10 c. 
62S•T., l-n, 77, 1 C I "Unde Y1dtaU8 quod hOllline. in al1q11& paI.1me ex1e-
tente., -nen tacile 1Mginat1onem avertunt &b his circa que att1cluntur. Unde 
per conaequene iudicita rat1cnie pleraque .eqi.l1tur pass1m_ appet1tus 88I111t1-
lVi) et per oonaequens motus voluntaU., qui natua .st .equi 1udiciUlll ration1 •• 
cr. alao 33, ) ad 2 and E.! H!'+o, 3, 10 c. 
6) e.G., I. S5. 
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employ. ~ttender~ and intender~ interchangeably. "(A)d actum cuiusclRque ooa-
noscitivae potentiae requir1tur intentio, ut probat Augustinus in lib. 2! 'l'r1nit 
Intentio autem unius nan poteet terri ad multa smul, nisi torte illa multa hoo 
modo aint ad invioem ardinata, ut acoipiantur quaai unum; siout nec aliouius 110-
tus vel operationil pos.unt eale duo tennini non ad invicem ordinati. Unde, cUm 
sit una an:1ll&, in qua <Dna. cognoacitivae potentiae f'undantur unius et eiusdem 
intentia requirltur ad <1IDium. potentiarum cognoacitlvarum actua: et ideo, cum 
totallter anima 1ntendat ad actua lmiue potentiae, abatrahitur hOllo ab actu &1-
teriuf) potentiae •• 64 In airtilar 'Vein and to the lame effect I .. [Q 1u1a ames 
potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur, necease est quod, quando 
intentio aniIlae vehementer tra.hitur ad operation_ unius potentiae, retrahatur 
ab ope ratione alteriusl unius enint animae non potest esse nisi una 1ntentio. 
It propter hoc, Ii aliquid ad ae trahat totam intentiona an1mae, vel magn8.lll 
partem ipsius, non oompatl tur secum aliquid aliucl quod aagnam attenticmeIB 
requirat. tt6S Again, it surely il !! who att~d: nEe. qutbua veheDlent1u.a inten-
dimus, magi. in memoria manent.a66 
Fourth~, despite the prOKiaity ot the two, attention il not the. saRe aa 
intention, the act of the Will. The reason ia that the intellect can retlect 
upon, and consequent:q attend to, every act or the will, including intention or 
64~ !!r., 13, .3 o. 
6S!.!.., I-II, 37, 1 c. Also, ~., n-II, 17S, S ad 3. «(V11res animae 
vegetabills non operantur ex intentione animae, sicut v1re. sensitivae, sed per 
modum naturae. Et ideo non requiritur ad raptlD abstractio ab eis, aiout a 
potentiis senait1vi., per quarum operationes minueretur intentio animae oir.ca 
intellectivUl cogniticuem.1'I 
66 
.!! ~ !!!!., S (ad .f':1n. lae par.). 
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the end. For if' the "voluntas vult int.ellectum intelligere," it is equally t.rue 
that the ttintellectus intelligit. Tolunt.atem. ,,67 Further proof of this Ues in 
the fact. t.hat. the object. of int.ent.ion is that good (the end) to which certain 
means are ordered, wher... the object of attenticm can be any good or 111 y truth. 
In the fifth plaoe, it all that. haa been said in t.he tirst four points is 
true, it follows that., when the attention. of the intellect. focuses on the object 
of the will which i. an cd to which are ordered m.ean8, and the will desires 
that object, then the intenUm ot the end is what is called an actual. intentim 
The power does not act without it, object. But the object of the will requisite 
for an act of intention JlU8t. be intentionally represented and proposed by the 
intellect, which cannot. occur unless the intellect is attending to the object. 
ConSequently actual intention of an end requires and is distinguished :trail other 
types of intentian by the attention of the intellect paid to the end and to the 
_ans as for that end. Attending to this cClD.p08iteobject, the agent will. the 
end-this i. actual intention. 
Just as attention, so intensim is a Dlod!tying characteristic of intention. 
Intension, or the increaeing of velOCity to ~ peak, i. opposed to r&1lission, or 
the deereaaing of velOCity once the peak ha. been reached, or at least once SaBe 
higher point haa been reached.68 Strictly, it would be correct to say that an 
operation which began from reat and is just on ita way to gaining sOlIe momenta 
has some intensity. But u,age seems to prefer that intClsity aignify an :1ncU-
nation or movement with a certain vehemence. Hence to operate with a small 
-,_._---
67 ~.!., I, 16, 4 ad lJ cf. also 82, 4 ad 1; De Ver., 22, 12 c. 
--68~ !!! Cado, II, 8 and 9 J E! ~ q. un., 1, ad 16. 
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outlay' of effort would be to act remissly or halt-heartedly or moderately, but 
to act with intensity is to act with "Vigor, with Tehemence.69 So the human 
agent can exercise in his activity a range of degrees ot intensity, depending em 
the energy- with whioh the soul inolines toward SOlIe objeot or some one of its 
own act •• 70 The following sumo iates aptly St. ThOmas' "View ot intension and 
the soul's powers. ·Praeterea, quando una Tirtu. IlUltum. intenditur in sua opera-
tione, alia potentia abstrahi tur a suo actu I siout illi qui "Veh_enter intendtmt 
ad aliquid audiendua, nm percipiunt "Vi. ea quaei coram ipsi. ti1m'- J "(Qluando 
mens intenditur in euo actu circa absentia, quae_unt a sensibus raota, tunc 
propter "Vehementi_ intentioni. sequitur alienatioa sensibus. w71 
The dynamio source of this greater or less d~gree ot energy exerted is, ot 
I 
i 
course, the whole supposit united by a single sota, l;>ut again, sinoe the soul's 
I ' 
I ,', 
rational inclination i. called a will and its other iitolinationa are given the 
names ot other appetitive powers, the energy is ottemattributed to the motion 
ot the will and the other appetites. Thus it is ."'erred that the sensitiTe apo-
" 
petite moves with intensity to the oonsequent "~etrilllent of the will's motion, 12 
rI 
69!_!e, I-II, 35, 6 0 I "am omnis Matus ~a~ralis intendor est in fine •• 
• • Unde et inclinatio appetitivae virtutis, pe~ se loquendo, vehementius tendit 
in delectation. <tU8lll tugiat tristitiam.- ~., 37, I 0: -quando intmtio 
anima. vehementer trahitur ad operationem. unius potentiae ••• tI 
10.E!.!!!:., 13, 3 OJ .!! lIal2. 3, 9 CJ !.!., I-II, 17, I 0 and 2 o. 
71~.!., II-IL, 173, 3, obj. 2 and ad 2. 
72!e!., I-II, 17, I 0: hEt secundUDl hmc modUDl, per quando distraction., 
quando aotus appetitu8 sensitivi tortitioatur secundua quamcumque passiona, 
nece.se est quod rem1ttatur, vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitu8 
rationali8, qui eat voluntas. N 
!aDd that the will can desire inten8ely a 8inful act7J or a good &ot.74 
Since the will is capable of de8iring intensely any act, it can intend in-
tensely also. -tllntenaio actus interioris vel exterioris potest referri ad in-
tention_ ut objectuml puta cum aliqui. intendit inten8e velle, vel &liquid in-
tanse operarl. u75 Thus inten8ity modifies intention as it doe8 other will act8. 
One final. point deserves notice: the mutual infiuence of attention and 
~tensit;y. Attention stimulates inten8it;YJ intensity, on the other hmd, foster 
~ttention. '1'hat St. Thomas reoogni&ed thi8 fact seems apparent frClll the various 
tpas8age8 cited already in discussing attention and intension. However, one 
~dditional text will bring out the interaction. lIJ(anife8tum est ana quod quan-
documque una potentia intenditur in suo actu, alia potentia vel impeditur vel 
totaliter avertitur a suo actuJ 8icut cum &liqu18 intentus est ad aliquem audi-
endum, non percipit hom1nea pertranaeuntem. it hoc ideo conting1t, quia omnes 
potent.iae radicantur in una an1m&, cuius intentio appl1cat unamquaaque potentia 
ad SUUlll actUIIU et ita CUll. aliqu18 fueri t fOIiiter intentu8 circa actum uniu8 
" 
potentiae, minuitur eius intentio circa acta :alteriu8. Sic ergo ClB fuerit 
concupiscentia forti8, aut ira, aut aliquid hu:1.uSlllodi, impeditur a considera-
tione 8cientiae.n76 
With the elemente that belong to the act of intention (hence e.pee1all;y to 
an act of actual intention) known, the next two chapter8 inveetigate the nature 
of habitual and virtual intention. 
7J1bid., 6 C <ad fin.) and ad 3. 
74-Ibid., 24, J, ad 1. 
75-~.!., I-1I, 19, 8 c. 
76£! !&lo, J, 9 c. 
CHAPrER II 
HABITUAL INTENTION 
The subject or this chapter will be the hahi tual intention. Though an 
anaeration of the three types of intention has acquired the more or less cua-
tomary sequenoe of actual, virtual, and habitual, the order here to be followed 
inverts the last two. For this study' 8 chiet O)ncern is directed to virtual 
intention, with the other two subordinated to it as much as possible. Fitting-
ly, therefore, the explanation of the lBabitual intention should precede discus-
sion of the virtual. Also, this choice ot arrangement places immediately after 
the stud7 of actual intention what is more sharply centrastable with it. The-
c CIltrast will not only aid in understand!.'lg the two . types, but will in tum 
prepare for an easier understanding of the ~ture of vi,rtual intent\. on. 
Knowing what an habitual intention is haa its diffioulties. First of all, 
the differences between it and actual intention seem to overwhelm any res __ 
blances between the two. For, whereas the actual is defined as an elicited act 
ot the will regarding an end, in which reason enters by ordering and also by 
attending to the end in the act itself, the habitual even b;y its name professes 
not to be an act, and rules out as a consequence the possibility at aocompany;-
ing attentiveness. The difference str:1k:es a person as SO considerable, in tact, 
that one can justifiably raise into question the propriety of calling the habit-
ual intention an intention at all. In what sense, then, does "habitual inten-
26 
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signify an in1ientiont In the sense that 1ihe ac1i of intention has been repeated 
many 1iimes' Such an interpretation of the sense of the words is possible, but 
this is not what st. Thomas means by an habitual intention, or rather, by inten-
ding habitual.ly (for he seems never to have used the ph!"ase habituaf intentioo 
as it was used by later philosophe!"s and theologians).l Perhaps, then, the 
phrase means that an intending ot an end exists in the will neither in actuality 
no!" in f:vtentiality only, but in saae intemed1ate staget This could indeed be 
the case, tor quite unmistakably St. Thomu often so describes a habi1i.2 
Howeve!", one ough1i not answer too hutiq. It can turther be asked whether 
~his :tarabitual intention, if it truly is a habit, is really a habit or disposi-
tion ot the 11'111, or Illq i1i no1i rather be a habi1i of 1ihe in1iellect'l lor it 
.. ould ae. that it cannot belong to the will. 'irst of all, at. Thomas states 
explicitly 1ihat the will' a nature il completely adequate tor its proper opera-
tim, and consequently needs no babita, i.e., needs ,no qualities which dispose 
it tor operation) -(D]upl1c1 ratione aliq",-, potentia hab1tu indiget. Pr:t;uo 
" 
quid_, quia operatio quae est per potentiam eduoenda, excedi t Vim potentiae, 
quaavia non excedat vim totius naturae h1DAD.&e. Alio modo quia totiua naturae 
vim $Xcedit •••• Primo autem modo ind1get habitu intellectuaJ eo quod intelli-
gere aliquid non potest nili a.similetur e1 per speciem intelligibilem. • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Artectiva au-
lIn §.!., III, ~, 8 ad J St. Thomas uses the phrase to mean virtual inten-
tion. This unusual usage will be explained in the next chapter. 
2 !.!., I, 79, 6 ad J; 87, 2 c; I-II, SO, 4 ad 2; 71, ) cJ et ale 
lS.T., I-II, 49, 1 c. 
- -
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tea superior ncm indiget hoc modo aliquo habitu, quis naturaliter tendit in bo-
nUl'll sibi connaturale sieut in proprila obiectua. Unde ad hoc quod velit borrwIl, 
non requiritur ni.i quod ostendatur sibi per via eognitivam ... 4 Again, n (pJ er 
habitum virtuti. potentia quae ei sub11citur, respeotu sui actus complem.entum 
aequirit. Und. ad id ad quod potentia aliqua •• extendit ex ipsa ration. paten-
ti&8, non eat necessariua habitu8 v1rtutis. Virtus aut_ ord1nat potentias ad 
bonum; ipsa enill est quae bonum tacit habentel, at opus eius bonUII reddit. 
Voluntas aut_ hoc quod virtus tacit circa alias potentias, habet ex ipsa ratio-
ne SU&e potentiae. nam eius obiectum eat bonum. Uncle tendere in bonum. hoc modo 
se habet ad voluntatem sicut tendere in delectabUe ad concupiscibil_, et 81cut 
ordinari ad sona se habet ad auditUil. Unde voluntu nCll indtget aUquo habitu 
virtutis inclinante ips_ ad bonua quod est sibi proportionatlD. ItS 
The.e words deSCribe, however, the will t S opere.tion with regard to its 
formal objeot, the good in general. Hence at. Thc:aa. shoq just as well that 
the will neverthele.s requ1rea habits tor op,rat1ng promptly, easily, firmly, 
and with pleasure in regard to this or t.bat partioular good.6 still, "the diffi-
oulty remains, because the habits that St. Thoaas is .peaking ot are virtues, 
4B!, .!!!:., 24, 4, ad 9. Ct. also .§..!., I-II, 62, l ad 1 and c. 
SDe Vinoo in COIIIIl., So. The objeotions JUke certain that. there is no 
mistakiiig-si: ThOiu.-;tmindJ e.g., the first: ft[A)d imperandum sutticit voluntati 
iudieium rationis; nail voluntas appetit naturaliter quod est bonum secundum 
rationem, sicut coneup1scibilis quod eat delectabile secundum sensum." 
6Soo T., I-li, 50, 5 ad 1: "Sed quia necessarium est ad tinem. humanae Vitae, 
quod vrs-appetitiva !nclinetur in &liquid determ1natum, ad quod non inclinatur 
ex natura potentiae, quae se habet ad multa et diversa; ideo necesse .st quod 
in voluntate, et in al11s viribua appetitivis, sint quaedam quaUtates incli-
nantes, quae dicuntur habitus." Also: 49, 4J 56, l 0; II-II, 58, 12 o. 
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Inamely, the virtues of charity and justice'? But an intention of the end is not 
a virtue, as is evident from the fact that a man .. ith many virtues can have a 
bad intention, and on the other hand a man with vioious habits can at the same 
time act with a good intention. "Et ideo sieut potest contingere quod aliquis 
habens habitum vitiosUJI, prorumpat in actum virtutis, eo quod ratio non totali-
ter corrumpitur per malum habitun, sed aliquid eiu. integrum. manet, ex quo pro-
venit quod paccator ali qua operatur de genere bonorum ... 8 -(p] ecoatum oomparatur 
ad virtuten stcut actus malul ad habitum. bonum. Aliter autem B8 habet habitus 
in anilla, et forma in re naturali. Foma enim natura1is ex necessitate producit 
operationem sibi convenient_ • .. •• Sed habitus in anima nm ex neees.!tate 
producit SU8.1ll operation., sed hOlllo utitur eo cta voluerit. Unde s1mul habitu 
in homine existente, pote.t non uti habltu, aut agere contrarium actum. Et 
sic potest habens virtutem procedere ad aetua peccati. n9 
Not only does it seen that the habitual intention cannot be a habit of the 
will, but, judging fran the .. ~rd. of the Ang,lic Doctor himself, a habitual in-
tention .eem. to. be a habit of the intelleat, ·8imilar to the habitual knowledge 
of f!rst principle. or of a science, and existing thu. a8 nothing else but a 
species in the intellectual m_o17. In the first place intelligible speoies 
in the memory constitute .ome kind ot habit: tt[S]pecies intelligib1118 aliquando 
e.t in intellectu in potent1.a tantuml et tunc dicitur intelleotns e.se in poten-
7l)e Vin. in COI'IIl., , c: ·Sie ergo duae virtutes sunt in vo1untate sieut 
in subIecto,; seTIi'aetcarita •. et iustitia." Cf. a.1so ~.!., I-II, 56, 6 c. 
8~.!., I-II, 78, 2 oJ o~ler pertinent passages: 3 a and ad 2, ad 3; 4 c. 
9~., 71, 4 o. 
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tia. Aliquando autem aeeund'Ulll ultimam oompletionem aotwu et tunc 1ntelligit 
actu. Aliquando .. dio modo se habet inter potenti_ et aotulU et tunc dicitur 
a"e intellectue in habitue Et aecund\1ll hunc modum intellectus conaervat spe-
ciea, etiam quando actu nan intelligit. ulO This habit'issODle kind ot actual1t7 
but not a perfect kind: "Nee tamen aequitur quod semper intelligatur aeoundum 
ill_ speci_, sed solUll quando intellectus possibilia pertecte fit in actu 
reepectu illiu8 speciei. Quandoque Tero est iaperfecte in actu nus quod8laodo 
Imedio inter pure.m potentl&m et pllrlal acta. It hoc est habitual iter cognoscerel 
et de hoc m.odo, cognition!s reduoitur in actUJlt perteetum per yoluntatea."ll 
Then, from the follOWing text, it appears that an habitual intention would be 
n1lnbered amOng the species in the intellectual. lIlemo1"7, considering that an act 
of the will can be retained in the 1181101'71 .. {S]lcut Auguetinus probat XIV 2!. 
!!:!:!!., inteillgere dic1m.ur et "telle seu amare al1qua, et quando de his ex> g1:ta-
~ua, et quando de hia nm COgit8llUS. Sed quando .ine cogitatione 8\1Rt, ad solam 
.Mor1am pertinentJ quae nihil est aliud, sec.undum ipaum, qua habitual1s reten-
tio notitiae at amori •• -12 
Further evidence of st. ThOlll&8' lIind cOIle. from a comparison of texts. 
wHab1tualiter enlm refert in Deum et qui nihil aglt, nec aliquid act_liter 
1ntendit, ut dormiens, .13, and ·(1]0 quod habitualiter ineat, quandoque aliquie 
ut1 nOl'l poteat propter al1quod imped1m.entwlU aieut homo non potest uti habitu 
10 6 81• !.!., I, 79, ad 3. Ct. alao I, q. 7 ad 1. 
II De Ver., la, 2, ad 4. 
12--
§..!., I, 93, 7 ad 3. 
13,!!. Car1t., 11, ad 3. 
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sCientiae propter 8omnum. ~t similiter puer non potest uti habitu intellectus 
principiorum, vel etiam lege naturali, quae ei habitualiter inest, propter 
de!ectlll aetatis.a14 Considering the tWo, and knowing how, inevitably, St. Tho-
~s will give as instances ot habitual intention the disposition ot a II&n who 
is asleep, or insane, or in Tenial sin, the conclUsiCll'l followa 84sily that the 
habi tual intention resides in the memory of a man who is asleep, etc., in the 
same way that the man's habitual knowledge is retained in his _.ory, or, to be 
more preCise, in his possible intellect. 
ivery-day experience rallles to the support of this c oncluai on, for does 
Inot a man who wakes frca 81eep have to tum back to his memory to reiUmber what 
Ibe had intended to do first thing on riling? Men, allo, who regain conlciou ... 
lnes8 after haYing suffered an utlexpected loss of it, for a time are at a 1088 
to do anything, WltU they have "gotten their bearings" a. thel say} that is, 
Wltil they haTe recalled either what they were doing previously. or hUe situated 
themselves in their present circum8tance8.' l!nlike the man who has deliberately 
• 
8urrendered him8ell to _luaber, theae have not'had the opportunity to toresee 
their e1tuatiQl upon retum of consciousness, and thus they could not have 'pre-
intended' the actions they would perfOl'll in that situation. Hence, a peraon in 
this predicament i_ temporarily mabIe to act for any deliberate end, until he 
remembers what his ]a. st intention was and discOT8rs the identity of hi_enYirm-
mant.lS The point to be stre.sed here is that the habitual intention seems, 
from both the words of st. Thomas and the testimony of experience, to consist in 
14 !.!., I-n, 94, 1, ad 1 in contr. 
15The person might very well execute instinctive acts, certainly, such as 
rubbing his head or eyes, or casting about for scme clues to his location, etc. 
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10thing elae but a vestige in the possible intellect. 
However attractive these arguments may be, the truth ia that St. Tbc.aa 
fmderstands the habitual intention as S<IIlehow a disposition of the will. One 
~counters no amibigui ty in auch texta as I -In amentibua autem et dormientibus 
~otest esse voluntas cmtraria habitual1s, quamv1s non sit actual1a. Et ideo 
s1 ante aOllrlum vel furiam f'uerunt ccntrariae voluntati8, non recipiunt sacramen-
tUDl, quia adhuc illa vollmtas habitual iter manet, .16 and -@JiCut modu8 praesen-
tis vitae non patitur ut homo semper actu feratur in Deum, ita etia non patitur 
quod actu feratur in ClImes prox1m.os 8:ingillatimt sed aufticit quod feratur com-
mun1ter in ames in universali, et in singulos habitualiter et 8ecundum animi 
praeparation_.,,17 The "terri- of which st. 'l'h01US apeaks in this st9Cmd pas-
sage refers to the activity ot loving, the object ot which is either God or the 
ineighbor. since both the objection and the reply given here accept the phrase 
~ ~ habit!!!lll as 8aid of God, and since loving .God must nece8sarily be done 
at least somet:1m.es o.n.ly by lanng intentions, this second quotation iapllcitly 
state. what the fi1"llt expresses in clear terms. 
Neverthele8S, what has been said about the species in the possible intel ... 
lect is not to be rejected as amisinterpretation or a mistake. Bather, it fills 
in me aspect of the picture. For, let it be recalled, an actual intention is 
of an end, and consciously of an end. That means that the i.ntellect was pre-
senting to the will an object, ~ being directed by the will to attending to 
the object, and was therefore by reflex1m seeing itself aa doing these things 
16m IV Sent., 6, 1, 3, 3 ad 2. 
- -17 !.!., II-II, 184, 2 ad 3. Ct. also 44, 4 ad 2. 
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and seeing the will as willmg that object. N",.. all that tohe intellect has 
apprehended can be retained by it, in the memory or po.sible intellect, in the 
tom ot intelligible species. '!'hi, it is that enables a man to reflect back 
upon hia m_orr to recall his intentim. For what he can aee there ia not ml:y' 
the object ot his intentioo (i.e., the 8l'1d), but also the tact that he had made 
an intention. Therefore the intention does reside in the intellect a. a habit 
of the intellect, a. a particular speciea in the possible intellect represent-
ing the will'. act of :mtmding a certain end. But it this were all that is 
necessary to constitute an habitual intenUon, then the term very clearly is 
Dd.sleading,18 and St. Thaaas has erred often in his oonception ot habitual 
intention, to take the above-quoted texts as only two examples. 
On the other hand, it at.ThaDas understands the habitual intention as a 
quality ot the will, howcan he meet the objection baaed on his 0Im words; 
namely, that the CIll7 habits of the will are charity, in the supernatural 
order, and justice, in the natural order? 
At thi. point the author of this thea is wishe, to propose his own ,olution 
to a problem which he thinks st. Thcaas nowhere fomulates expliCitly. And he 
wiehes to solve the problem in, the only manner he thinks possible: by advanc-
ing the explanation as he seea it frca clues tound in st:,rhcmas' words on 
habit, and the moral virtues, and thm by pre .. nting afterwards the passages 





l&rbe term habit i. being _played in the appll~Ct~.-~rlbed in S.T., 
I-II, 9u, 1 CJ "00 liquid pote.t diei es.e habitus dupliciter. Uno modo'; -
proprie .t esaentialiterl et sic lex naturalis non est habitus •••• Alio modo 
•• '. id od habitu teneturf sicut dieitur tides id quod tide tenetur." 
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Accordingly, he proposes first of all that the habitual intention is not 
to be cCIlceived aa a separate habit in the soul, but aa the resultant of, or the 
product of, a ntaber of habits in the soul-not an actual product, of course, 
because 1t ia 8OIl8tb1ng habitual that 1. being BOught, but one which exist. 
rlrtuall.7 in tho.. habi ta • A aingl. hui t will not explain babi tual intention. 
Natural charity, or natural. d1leation as st. ThCIIIIU calla it, cannot explain) 
for the will n_da no hahi t to operate in reprd to objects which it can will 
natural.ly.19 Giyen that t.he intellect baa pro_ted the will with eri.d.eDce 
that God is ita ohief good, the rill responde 1Duaed1ately. Consequently natural 
charity is not • habit ot the will. lor oan j\l8ti08, the only habit aee1ped 
by st. Thou. to the rill its.lt, explain ccapletely the habitual intentica:. 
For the virtue of justice a:t.da a un to act in 0J2l7 eme field of etten. the 
exerei .. of correct relationships with the neighbor.20 Thua it 118 were look:1ng 
for an hahi tual jut 1ntentiOCl, we would .find. it in .the will' a habit of juatice. 
But the quest is for an bahi tul intention of any good, not merely that good 
which pertaina to the neighbor. Hence j118tiC8' iB not the IOUl"Oe of hAbitual 
intention. 
On. stroopr grOlUlda neither can the 'Virtues of fortitude and temperance, 
19Ct_ !_!., I, 60, 2 c, 3 c, 4 CJ I-II, 49 4 C and ad 3, 56, 6 c. 
20In S.T., II-II, 58, 12 C st.'1'hQllU 1s alunrering tbat justice 1s more 
excellent thin the other moral virtuea) legal juaUce clearly is so,and partic-
ular juat1*.'j(jj:80 tor two reasons: "Quana prima poteat 8UJI:1_parte subieoti t 
quia sc1licet eat in nob1l1ori parte an1mae, ideat in appet1tu rationali, scili-
cet voluntate; &111. v1rtutibuB moral1.bua exiBtentibus in appetitu aen8itivo,ad 
qua pertinent passion.a, quae aunt _teri. aliarum vlrtutum morall_. Secunda 
ratio 8lIIIlitur ex parte obieoti. lla aliae virtute. laudantur sol. secundum 
bonUlll ip.ius virtuosi. Iuatitia auta laudatur secundum quod vinuo.us ad ali_ 
bene .. babein et IJic 1uatitia quodaaloclo eat bonum alterius.- ct. alSOI Ibid., 
2 e and 3 C J I-n, 56, 6 0 I 100, 2 ad 2: De V1rt. in COIII8., 5 o. 
---~ ........ --.-, 
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the habits found in the iraec1ble and concupiscible powers respectively, satia!7 
our search. The .. v1rtues are reall7 only a -ll-eltabllshed confol'llity of the 
two "naitive appetites t~ the dictat •• of reason. 2l 
!boUgh the pos.ibilities tor finding a hab1t tor the will have seemingly 
Ibeen exhaueted, two raa1n. The first is that ot pruden.e. the v.Lrtue ot the 
IPractical. intellect whose object is the proper_on leading to an end. The 
second poasibillt7 il that of a cOIIb1nation of the moral. Virtuel. the author ot 
fthis th.sis think. that the answer will b. found in the latter chOice, with pru-
Idence nece.sarily numbered UlQllg th_. 
He propose. that, when St. Thaaa. l1888 the term habitual intention, he baa 
~ !dnd that atate of the .oul in which the practioal intellect is intoraed nth 
prudenoe (or with the COl'reapQllding nae of imprudence), the .en.itive appetite. 
~re po ...... d ot the aoral. virtue. of tortitude and temperance (or the cont1"&17 
!riae.), and the will i. po ...... d of the aoral virt. of jUst1o.22(or injustice)J 
~o that, wi1;h the soul eo disposed, the will .has been also di.posed in a "r.Y 
~in1te manner to intend an end in accordance··with right rea.on (or against 
~ght reason). The rtrtue ot justioe is included in this state ot the .oul be-
.ause its preeence in the w1ll is nee.ssary, even though it Il&y not b. exercised 
in ""17 h'tlUll action. ane's habitual intention can be the reault of one'. last 
nas., I-II, 56, 4 c J IIIn hi. igitur circa quae operatur iraacibilis et 
pcmcuplac;lbil1s secllllldua quod ._10 a rat10ne motae, nee .... e.t ut al1qu1. habi-
tus pertiei" ad b.ne apndua .1t non .01_ in ratione, •• d atiam in ira.scibil1 
~t conoup1ecibll1. It quia bona dispo8ltio potenti .. moventi. motu, attenditur 
Iaecund\8 confo:naitat_ ad potenti .. movent_; ideo virtua quae est in irascib1l1 
~t concup1ec1bill" nihU aliud est qua quaedaR habitual1. contormit&l i.taraa 
J>otent1a.rum ad ration_." Of. also.!! nne ~ £!:!e.., b c. 
22Justice in the proper sen •• , not the metaphOrical, as noted abewe (p.34, 
~. 20) is what i. Mant throughout thi8 section. 
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delibera"te act with regard to one t • selt, in which caso prudence and taperance 
and forti tude are involved (and the.e three are al .. ..,.s involved), but not jue-
tice. Nevertheless, at the time or that act the rill had to have the virtue ot 
justice, for if prudence and the other moral virtues are present, justice must 
be also present,23 and, vice veraa, 11' injustice prevail. inatead of justice, 
then the man i. not trul;y ordered to hi. proper end, and eo doe. not haye the 
other moral virtue •• 24 
Prudence and the moral virtues are interl1nked in dependence. 'lbe me ra-
uire. the other.. Thus, when a choice of action i. offered to a man, the proc-
• that take. place before he choo ... i •• aa.."hat the following' the practical 
tellect examines the object (be it a thing or an extemal or intemal action), 
ees its relation to the end, and propose. the object in its rela't1en to the end 
o the willJ25 the rill then ia free to desire thia object tor that end, or not 
o de.ire it; me&nWhUe, the aensitive appetite. haVtt been attracted to or N-
ulaed frau. the same object ( .. hich, be it noted, i. now modif:1ed, or informed, 
2.3 I.!., 1 ... 11, 65, 1 c: tI (ji] ulla virtu. morali. poteat .ine prudentia haberi 
o quod propritllll virtutia morali. eat facere electionem rectam.. ••• Similiter 
ti .. prudentia non poteat haberi nili habeantur virtutee morale a : cura prudentia 
it recta ratio agibll1\11'1, quae, sicut ex principiis, procedit ex. fini.bua 
glb1l1m, ad quos allquie recte se habet per virtutea moralea. ft Cf. also: De 
in. Cardinal., 2 cJ 8:r., I-II, 58, 4 c and ad ); 64, .3 CJ 61, .3 and 4; and', 
inallY, >8, 5 c: "[Ald rectam rationem agibi.l.1.Dt, quae eat prudentia, requiritur 
ad homo habeat virtutem moralem." . 
24Bea1des the locations in the Suaa given in the preceding note, eapeciall 
ertinent ia the section in De Virt. Cardinal., 2 c (ad fin.). 
--
251.1., I-n, 57. S c: I1{fJrudentia est virtue max] .. neceesaria ad vitam 
'UIIlanam •••• Cull aut_ el8Otio sit eorua quae aunt ad finem, rectitudo electi 
• duo requir1t. 8Oi110.t debita t.1.nemJ et id quod conven1enter ordinatur ad 
ebitum. fin_. .Ad debita alItem fin_ homo cOIlV'enienter dispon1tur per virtuta 
uae perficit partem an:1Jaae appetitiV'am, CuiU8 obiectura .st bonum. et finis. Ad i 
utem. quod convenienter in finem debit_ ordinatur, oportet quod hano direct. 
aponatur per habit_ rationia. rudenti ." 
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~ the end, as matter by its form26), and they are either aiding or conflicting , 
with the will and the reason. 27 low, this process take8 place :in preparation 
for every actual intention, for the will has a choice of intending or not inten-
ding. In other words, the act at intention i8 itself the matter for choice. 
But an actual intention i8 thought of as issuing from some habitual dispo-
sition since habits are the sources of acts. ItUncie virtus quae facit bene &gere 
in actu, non solum in facultate, oportet quod .el 8it in ipsa voluntate; vel in 
aliqua potentia secundum quod eat a voluntate mota •• 28 Hence, if in the process 
described above the practical intellect is disposed either for gooci or for bad, 
and the sensitive appetites are correspondingly disposed, then the will i8 it-
self going to be disposed either to good or to bad,29 and should an acc.sioo tor 
intending a good end present itself', the will would cormaturally tend to the end 
if it is well disposed, or aTold the end, it' ill disposed toward it. The will t S 
freedom 1s not taken from it, but it truly 1s disposed as it by a habit ot its 
own to pursue a certain end more easily, fin,ll.y, and pleasantly than to pursue 
26!.Ie, II-II, 4, 3 c ... [A]ctus voluntar1l speciem: recipiunt a fine, qui 
est volmtatis obiectUlll. ld aut em a quo al1qtd.d speciem sortitur s. habet ad 
modum formae in rebus natval1bus. Et ideo ouiuslibet actus voluntarll forma 
quodammodo est finis ad quem ordinatur J tum quia ex ipso recipit speciem, t'Ulll 
etiaa quia modus act1ooi8 oportet quod respondeat proportic:naliter tini.a 
27~., 56, 4 ad 3. BSed irascibilia et concupiscibills non ad nutum obe-
diunt rationi, sed babent proprios motus suos, quibus interdua ration! repug-
nant." Ct. also De Virt. in Comm., 4 c. 
--.... .................. .......-. 
26 Ibid., 3 c. Ct. also 88, 3 CJ I, 93, 7 OJ I-II, 71, 3 ad 2. 
-
29Ibid., 56, 4 ad 4t -[IJn electione duo sunt. scilicet intentio tinis, 
quae pertIiiet ad virtuta moral.; at praeacoeptio eius quod est ad finem, quod 
pertinet ad prudentiam; ut .d1eitur in VI ~th12. Quod autem habeat rectam inten-
tionem finis circa passiones aniaae, hoc contingit ex bona dispositione lrasci-
bilis .t ccmcup1scibilia. E't lC:l;v virtutea morales circa passionea, sunt in 
irasciblli et concupiscibili." Alsoa ~., S8, 4 and S. 
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he ccmtl"U7 end. Tbera1"ore, before :1. t act. tor an enG, the wm 1. alreacl7 p 
diapoeed cme W&7 or the other, tor the good. end or the bad. 1'b1a cCIld1t1C111 is, 
to a certia1D extct, its own do1Ilg. SJnce 1t la71d.thin the wiU's panr to 
ow theae diapo8i tims to ~ 111 tbe aoul or to rid the aotal. of tttea. mere 
cl1Datng to or retue1q the _d proposed, the last _, ot intent.1<m has giv-
e pract10al intellect and the aenaitive appet.1tea their or1entatima. Bence 
ral 1IIputab111t;y i. referred to the rill aDd, throush the will,to the euppoait 
ID other worda, the habitll&l. 1n'-t.1oa "'e haTe b .. aeek1l1g reters, traa 
OIle aspect, to .. inteU_ which ia Bot aotual.ly being produced b7 the will,ll 
which 1JOUld .0" l1kel1' be pro4uaed b7 tbe will, beea __ that 18 the..., the 
18 disposed. It would proc_d boa the will 1nev1tab~, .. ept that the 
-.1O)'a the bHdca to chooae the cODtrar.y. 'rca cother upeot tbe habit 
iDtaDUcm ntera to ,be habitual diepoa1tioa or the IOlIl, which tile 1Dclude. 
ot CIll7 the w1ll blR WO \be tacnll:'i •• wh1ch channel the w1ll ad who .. 
re .. ' ata_. abide as .ips ot the .111' a laat deliberate cholce.)2 
301_!., I-II, lB, 6 c ... up br1etl7 the thoqht of MD7 previous articl •• 
on the will t. role 1n the moral act I 8Ita aut .. q1&Od eat ex parte 'V01UDtat1a, .. 
t ut t01'Ule ad ld quod e.t ex parM merion •• tua. qu1a 'YoltIDtaa utltUJ" 
ria ad aa-cha, a1cut 1ruJtl"\B8Bt1a J ne .. actus exterioNa halMrlt ratlcua 
oralltatl., nia11nqUllDt\1l aunt volvn'tal"11.- La ... , in 20, 1 0, where the 
goodne •• or ulloe of __ mal. .t. 1s diacua.ed, the .... o<I'&Clu1OD iaupheld. 
otiler ten. could be cited. I-II, 1, 1) 71£, 1, De Ver., 24, 1 c (where 
-.phaa1. 1. laid vpcn the suppoait aa the pr1nc1ple Ol Ii .. act.). 
l"'or ttpotent1al.lyu, a 'Y1rlU0U8 man t a will 1. e1 ther habt tully or act'tall.7 
1ntend1De a good end, ntta1n1DC, hOlfeT8r, ordtnarily, the potency to 1ntcd _ 
end. 
)2In the De 'er., 24, 10 st. Theaa. baa IlUCh to ..., about fNe choice and 
obat1nac,. that baa epactal. retelW10e to tM. utter or hab1twal ectioo. He 
ata'Ml that a IUD can naedJ the l'Ill"Pa ot pa.a101l b;r being r1ght17 d1epoaed re-
garding the end, that a fala. Jud, __ t ot reaaon about a parUcular object CaD 
at_ traa pua1<m or a bad habit, that a1n can baccae 'natural' to the rill. 
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Habitual intention .. nevertheleS8, must not be made entirely equivalent to 
~abitual disposition. The habitual intention i. an habitual disposition, but an 
habitual disposition need not be an habitual. intentim. A man, or the soul, or 
the will, may be said to be habituall7 disposed toward any good or any evil; 
thWJ, a man may have an habitual disposition to steal, to lie, to be lazy, etc. 
But the habitual intention leems to stand Chiefly tor an habitual diap08ition ot 
the will !! .!!!!!.!! regard !2.!h!. £!'OPer .!!!!!. !!!.!!!; thus, one'. habitual inten-
tion is either good or bad. Yet it may also be considered with regard to any 
end, and thus one might be .aid to haTe an habitual intention of ."ea.l1.ng, ot 
lying, etc., after one has deterained to steal or lie, but at present must 
attend to other tasks in no wise connected with the projected wrongdoing. In 
this case ot an hahi tual intention ot SCIIle lIi.deed, one" will is indeed disposed 
~th a habit, or better, i, dieposed in a JIl8lUler siallar to being disposed by a 
~bit (for this le_. why the di!poaitio is habitualis and not habitus). '!'he 
~abitual intention 1. more a dispolition than a hablt in the strict Thomiltic 
"~I 
fterminology. .AJ.ao, the habitual disposition _ •• Jlore a ·pbYllcl.l' realiV, 
the habitual intention more a 'metaphysical' realit7J that Is, it both te1'lllS are 
iapplied to the soul, the tOl1Ur de_ribel the soul with its ine~tiona both 
rational and sensible, while the latter describes the soul and Its powers as 
-
Iorieltated to the end. thUll, tor example, a tramp steeped in Ticious babits 
~akes an act ot love ot God just betore lapsing into unconsciousness} hi. intel-
p.ect and irascible and conoupiscible powers are, in one way, habltually disposed 
ito e'fil, and are also, sO to speak, poor physical wreaks} but thanks to the ,ood 
~tual intelt!on ot hi. will betore he lost consciousness, his powers are bah! tu-
ally reterred or orientated, to their proper end. 
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It i. po •• ible nc.: to retum to St. fhomaa h1maelf tor an explanation of 
the infiuence ot an habitual intention on the aOralit7 ot an act. But betore 
this retum i. aacie, how mllOh can be concluded .trc. the nature of an habitual 
intention, a. this nature has been explained by the author ot this the.i • ., 
Because, tor a man to pertom moral acta, he auet 1I'1ll th_ dellberate17, 
and because a aan'. habitual intction in no wise is an ,!!!. either of reason or 
of will, then it folloo that a :un should not merit according to his habitual. 
intention, bn anq acoorcl1ng to hisactual intentions.ll The sleeper, the drunk, 
the aad man do not urit or lo.e merit for their actions in their re.pective 
state.. The man who tran.'re •••• the moral 1_ onl7 sU£htl;r doe. not merit for 
hi. good habitual intention, and loaea urit for hia bad actual intention. In a 
dift.rent relation, honTer, the habitual intention does haYe moral consequence. 
,or the hab1tuJ. intention indio ate. the bent ot th. will, it. present incU. 
Ination, it. la.t cho.en orientation to t he end ot righ1; rea.on. Though the 
aleeper and the drt.lDk, on regaining their u .. of reaaon, could ohange their pre-
" 
.. nt di.position because ot their tree will, their will in ita disposition now 
remain. fixed in the direction (.ither tor or again at its proper end) 1 .. , 
deliberately decided upon. 
Will the worda of St. t'h<»1&8 substantiate the preceding ettort. to expres. 
~. understanding of habitual 1atention? It .... that thq will. The passages 
lin which St. Thea .. mentions habitual intention or matters related are not n.eJ'lo 
pus, and none of th_ describe it at length. But the ta that can be gathered 
.utfice to indicate st. Thanas' conception and use of the term. 
J3Both actual and virtual. 1Btent1on. are here designated ty the one phrase. 
This firat text a.aiat. in understanding what at. Thaaa. meant b7 the word 
habitual. "Omnia aut_ intel1eotUII in hab1tu per &llquaa .pee1e. intell1g1t t 
naa hab1tu. 'Yel eat hab1l1tatio quaed.am intelleotu. ad recip1enda apee1e. in-
te11lg1b11es qu1bus aotu fiat inteUlgen.) vel eat ordinata aggregatio ipprua 
speeier\a ex1stentl_ in intellectu non, secundum cOJIlple1na &Ot_, .. d aed:1o modo 
inter potentia et actUll. lion e.t igltur in 1plO (DeoJ hab1tual1a sc1ent1&. 
Praeterea, habltua quaedam qualitaa .st. Dec aut. non potest nee qual1tas neo 
aliquod &Colden. acoldera •••• Quia yero dispoait10 qua qui. eat hab1tu tanta 
conaiderans aut yolens vel agens a.s1m1latur disp08itionl dol'lll1ent18, h1nc est 
quod David ••• rreaori.~ hab1tual_ diepoa1t1ons a Deo.,,34 
Next, eme .t'1nda him re.terr1ng to the hab1tual diapo.ition of the m1nd,which 
frequently mean. for him the higher faculties ot the soul, both intellective and 
appetitive. "Habltu1. Taro propria e.t ut inclinet potenti_ ad agendum quod 
. . 
CODvwt habitui inquantUII facit id nderi bonUll qu~d e1 oonven1t, malua auta 
quod el l"8pugnat. Slout a1m guatu. d1iudioat sapores secundum sua d1epos1 t10-
nea, 1ta DUms halin1s d1iud1oat de aliquo fac1endo .. ound ... au_ habitual_ 
dispoai tiona: unde et PhU080phua dlc1t, in III Ethio. quod • qualis lUluaquS.S" , 
est, talis fini. v1detur 81' .1t3.$ Another time he deaor1bes the effect ot a hab-
1t of virtue, -(BJab1tUl rtrt.utu !nolinat hEn_ ad reot. agend'tlm, seoundula 
quod per Ip.am hcrao habet recta aestimat1on. de tine, quia, ut dic1tur in III 
Ethi:..·, quali. unuaquiaque eat, tali. et tW. v1.detur ei. S1cut en1a gustua 
ludioat de sapore, aecundua quod est attectU8 aliqua bona yel mala di.po.1t1one, 
34 £.Q., I, 56. 
3> !.!., II-II, 24, 11 c. 
ita 14 quod eat cOIlveaillla hc.a1n1 pcund_ ha'b!tal. diapos1t101l_ lib! 1nhae-
lWlt_, bona vel mal .. , utt1Utur ab eo ut bomaS quod auWa ab boo d18Cordat, 
aeatiJlatur ut aal_ at repupllD •• .,36 It..... aa1d \hat habltual. tntenUon .... 
to stand. oh1e.t'~, though not excluaively, for an habitual dUpo.ition of the .. 11 
•• eeen in regard. to 'the proper end. of 1lUl. 1he pnoad.1n, two tate c&r17 eOlle 
hint of .. lat A. Thaua' Idnd Will be in that recard, tor ill both he baa ooa-
neeted the noUOIl of babltul diapoatiOJl .. ith the notlon of II1d. Ba baa not 
ap_en 7'Jt of the hab1tvaJ. intention, but .. heu he doe. it will n ...... rily be 
in t.m. of 811 _d.. 
the nat puaap dilaOll8\.ratee that bab!hal. MRopit:l.OIl ac:aeUmee could be 
replaoed. d1reoU)r b.J: habt~ul utcUan. and po1Dt. O1&t that the habitual. int __ 
ti. or d:l.lPoe1t1c i. the neult of \he last cl»1c.. ·[F]er baptl __ etiaa 
adult! l1"at1ala auci,ere poe.-t 1rl d.ol'Jdado, quia 4(UoIIl'ria nOD. u.1t acutal.1a 
diapoaitl0 ex actuali ao\u volDtati., adeat ta8Il babltul1a diapO.itl0 ex 
motu 11ber1 ubitJ'lL1 praeoedent •• .J1 
• 
.A ereat naber of ft. lb..... ret.reDO •• ·~O an hUitul int_ti_ ocour in 
oOllDeoticm with h1a explanat1_ of the ."iIl, of the "'rele, "!IIou IIhalt 1"". 
the lord. th.,. God nth tb7 "ole he&1"\.- IDeri.t.ab17 _. '1baua 1f1ll di.t1Dp1ab 
the yano_ ...,.. in which a pentCB oan 10 .... God. 
h: pan. veJ"O d:U1aenUa carltae dioltur pert .. ta qaando 'eJ.1clu1 ..... 
omd_ tot. __ pea .. cDlipt. Quod quida continait tr1pllc1~r. Uno 
1IOClo, aic C(l1od. to1na oor h.'.la actl1Al1ter ..-pel" fuatv 1n Bra. E\ 
haec •• t perteoUo caritatia patriae: quae non e.t po.liblli. in hac vita .. 
in qua iJlpoa.a1blle •• t, propter hlDUU'la. vitae 1ntlrm1tat_. 88mpter actu 
eogitare de Deo et mover!. dileotlone ad 1pawa. Alio modo, ut heJllo atud.1lD1l 
3~ ...;Cari,;;;,,;;;,;;.t., 12 c. 
311! IV!!!!., 11, 1, 3, 2, act 3. 
aUla deputet ad vaaandmB Deo at rebUil d1:dm.8. prutem&ais alJ.la n1ai 
qwmt.um nec.u1t&e praesenti. vitae requirit. It ieta •• t perfectio carl-
taU. q .. ear\ poaaibilla 111 via. non taen· e.t c .. a1e omnibus caritatea 
habentlbua. Tertio Bodo, ita quod habituallter allquia totum cor 8UlD 
ponat in DeOt ita _w.o.t quod h1hU cogltet vel vilit quod 81t di'rl.D&e 
d11ectian1 cQfttrar1um.. It haec p.rteatio eat camaun1a aanibua caritde 
habentibws.3U -
In another place he .... 0Dl.7 • t1rotold diat1nctiCX'lr "IIao quldem 1Il0d0, in 
.t., 1'" ut wt._ Gor hOllin1 ••• per actual1ter in De. feratur. Et ieta eat 
perteotio patriae. .All0 &040, 1ft habit,.ater tot_ cor hOll.1D1& 111 De_ t.~ 
turl ita .,1110e' quodrUhU cent"' Dei dlleet1C1l_ cor haD1n1a 1'Mlptat.-39 An 
on. ueed ph:ra .. i. the .-t.at.ent tha' -quod. eB1a _tv:1D peacato TfJD:Salt, 
propter Deua ..tv habitll, et.a1neo .. tu. J&o . lil th ••• ".-..nte, panicl1lar17 
the third, .eN .ore cpre .. unU .. ~ ill \he pnri.oua ~. is .. ot an 
habitual ret __ .e, or d1reoUOIl, 01' 1nt8llUon (ltpropter DauIt-) olone '. love, 
ft. !h ... 18 pl.a1nll' tJdnk1nS ot an habitual. 1Dtentbn which 1. an habitual 
diapoa1 t1eo ot '\he win 111 th .reprd to Oocl, the 1&n end ot un. 
the 1 ... ot hab1tul1t)r ocoua ill other:,oontext.e al.o. aO'Jo&1tere dicl-
" 
tv dupl101ter. .1110.t ... d1a uta, .t ,..cnmdml habit •• Act1l qld. ... 1»-
poeAbil. eat .... hcao e.tiJiue poen1teat I ,1&1& neoe ... e.t .. ott actue poen1-
_Ue, Ave interior 81 .. exterior, 1aterpolet.v, ad II1m1I .-ao et al11a quae 
act nece,.itat. Corpori8 perUDent. A110 sodo Act'v poen1tere aecnm .. habi-
t_. .t a1c oportet fl1loc1 hcao oontinue poen1t .. t: et qUlmtum ad hoo quod han 
nUJ'lqua al1,u:Ld ccm'trula tao1at poen.1terlt1ae, per quod hab1tualia d1apoatt10 
· . 
poen1\ent.i. tollatvJ at quant._ ad hoo quod _bet. :1n prop08lt.o genre quod .... 
per .ibl peocat.a praeterit.& diapliceant..·41 Den71n1 the neoe.sity of aot.ual 
penitence f'o~ ~he rats.ioa. of' venial 8m., st. 1'bca .. addae .~ tam_ autticl 
habituaJJ.8 dilpl1centia, quae habet.ur per habit._ carlta18 ".1 poeD1t..Ua. 
riuti •• quia. • •• tJncle ",u1t.ul' Cluod reClu1rat.ur ....,edaa Y1rt.uaU. d1epl1o 
ia.Jt2 lJ1 both of the .. cOll'kd. the act, _acribed are not iat.enU .. ot the 
J hOtre'fW, th ... _t. are pl'OdwJt. of t.he tIlt.atic md slgn. or 1 t.. The 
.,.P8, thentoN, h.lp lllustrate St.. fh~t tmdar.tCu.t1nl of' bablt.ual1t7. 
eouem1ng the 1nt1umc •• _l'C1.ed bt the habltual 1ntentlC1ft OIl aoral act., 
St. 1'haua 1. expl1olt. ·[~n pller.1a non poteat .... oontrar1.a vol_ta. 1'1"_ 
t.\\ n .. _ habltu. 1'\ ideo nOll recald.r:l.tv "ol_ia. ".1 intent10 in 81., .. 
rohibeaa l"8aOV8&tv. Ia ._Ubua au'- .t dondentlbu pot .. t .... 'Volaw 
CDtrar:La hab1t1l&l.1., qua'f'i8 nOll .1t aotuall.. :1\ 1.0 ad. ante s~_ ".1 
r:t._ hel"tlDt cont.l'IIriM "ol __ t18, nc reo1p1..t. 'Mre.Dtla, .. adhuo 11la 
ol_taa hDltulit.er auet.-43 Ap1D, "lir]~ autt101t .runo habltulJ.. 0:rd:1-
'. tio -tv.. 1D Dera. C(1d.a ex hoo quod. e.t 11'1 hablt.u, null_ aretv, sed u hoc 
actu operatur. leo t __ oportet quod lat_tlc utulia ordinan. in tiD_ 
t1Ila ait eaaper CCDj'tlllCta cutl1'bet acUord. ... dic1tur in alJ. .. t1D_pro-
.J eecl auttiolt quod. allqt111lde .. tualiter .... 1111 tiDe. 1D t1Dea ultia_ 
erantv • .w.. Though this pG81tlon M'7 ••• 011 tlrat 11". to contradict what 
1cl . 
Ibld., III, 84, 9 o. 
-
JaIbid., 87, 1 o. 
-LlIn IV Sent_, 6, 1, 2, 3, ad 2. Ct. also DeVer., 24, 12 c. 
- -~ n !!!!., 40, 1, S, ad 6. 
he baa .aid about tbe ha'b1tual loye ot God beiD, enoup tor a un, the oppoei-
UGIl dieappeara when 1t 1. no4ied that St. Th0M8 ft. eq.1Dg that the hab1tual 
lew. ot God 1. -oaah to ke." a un trca sinD1nIJ :l. t doe, not, however, _ri t 
tor h1a. 
The final text juat1t:l.e. the .taDc1 that the habitUl intention of the will, 
aark1D, the Met reo_t cIel1bera\e oho:l... ot the will, de\eND •• iih. 1UUl' • 
•• :raJ. .ut.. Here ft ..... po1Dta out tb. f!4't that ill & •• rta1D ...... 
... t b7 hU1-' &leo, tor tabit •. are the pl"iDo:l.pl_ of act •• wJ.th thi. 'baai, he 
GaD CO em to Alnn, as 1a !! IY .!!!!., 6, 1, 2, ), ad I (tuo'eel .just above) 
and 11, 1, l, 2, ad 3, \hat, & .. t, w1ll baa aoral 1ntl-.. _. *. he 1, 
aal .. , or 1..... -liiJ.1Wl1lr.t bab1tibu et _tib •• aed aati_ qu&a11aatZ"Q-
.. U. UrID., tld.& _ate .... Ual1t.er ..n ._, ae4 haldU1:tq, .. prin-
oipU. M1'll.tora, et .. nl"t1ttibu .... a d1811mr •• 16 
!h:l.. ohapt.r bea- with ... ft&l probl_. to all &ppeuI.1Mt .. tlw habit-
ual. :l.DteDU. w .. .tar :r.arec1 t~ be:1.na a ~1t at all, cd .,. tarther trca 
, 
be1Dg a hab1t of \he w:Ul. .enrihel •• , _oard1ag to the Jd.ad. ~ ft. fhcaa • 
.. e&pft .... 1D the ,. upUc1t menace. to ~. hab1tual1ntentl., by 
babitul :t.n\eUae 18 an _at that .... .up l'eprw_a'U.D, the _tualllltent1ca , 
whicb 1. pre.n.d 1n the po.sibl. :i.ntell .. t. It aun • ___ be a habit or 
ct1apotr1t1_ of th. 1dll. • 
.lt thU atap ot iihe :i.nTeat1pUCft the author .ugpeted. a 101uUon 1n tea. 
ot a d1apGe1Uca ot the w1ll wh1oh ..... the reaultant of the habit. ot tbe intel-
lect and. the .... appet1te. and the will it.alt. rus aplaatiOil ...... to 
4S J! m .!!!l., 0, 1, 3, l, ad 1. 
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accord tul.l1 with the mind of St. Thaua as far as can be deterained by hi. 
treatment ot the aoral virtues, the habits ot the Will, and, finally, the habit-
ual diepoa1ticm of the will. The chapter ooncludes with a cliscussioo of the 
JIloral. influeace ot the habitual intmtion. em,iatently with its nature, it 
was shOlm. to haTe no influence wbatwer upon the goodness 0:1;" malice or an act, 
though the habitual. inteation ot the last end repre88ftta the 11111'8 own dispo-
sition with regard. to 'the propel" end t4 h.- action. 
CiAPDll III 
VIRTUAL II'tIJ'J.'IOI. ItS NATURE 
'fhu third ohapter 1. to deal primarily wit.h the nature ot virtual inten-
~ion. Preceding, howeYar, w111 b. a brief pl"8 .. ntaUan of the notion of 
ri,rtual. togethel" with the Y&1")'1.ng marmara in whioh st. th ... ued it in 
:anneotlon with the act ot tntent1on • 
.... ral cl1fterent phraaings o! the Bot1en of nrtual intention recur tre-
;uently. One ot the moat popular with Stt. thoma8 is "to refer virtually", as 
In. • [qJ uod omnia virtute "terantur in Dena, hoc partinet ad pertectiooaa cari.-
~atis ad qua.a O1'IIllea tenentur",l -(.\11100 est habituallter refer" in De_, et 
aliucl virtualiter.,,2 -to intact virtual.ly" ocour. in the saae passage. "[II]ed1-
I:ua, dum coll1g1t h al"ba. act1l, intendlt cont.~eere potion., nihil tort ... lil de 
.anitate coglte.u., virtuallter tamen intandit aanitat_, propter quam potion. 
~t.·) Very popular with It. thomas, too, is hie explanaUOR of the 'Y1rtual 
~tention in terms of "the tore. (or virtue) of the first intention" I ... in. 
~(JJ on oportet ut semper aliquis cogltet d. ultlllo tine, qwmdocUlllque &liquid 
"ppetlt ... el operatur, aed virtue primae intentionia, quae •• t re8p8ctu ultimi 
irinis, unet 1n quollbet appet1tu cuiuSCUlllQue rei, etiam .i de ultimo fine actu 
lDe Cant., ll, ad 2. 
--2 Ibid., ad 3. 
-) Ibid., ad 2. 
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pan coptetv_ S:iout nan oportet quod qui Tad1t per vi_, in quol1bet paaau 
poptet de tine,.h. .met aut_ (attent10 in orat1ane) aecl1Dduta virtut. • • • 
~1ai tantoa tiat evagat10, quod <lIIIl1ino depereat vis pr1mae intentioni.,·S and 
(where 8\_ Theau is apeak1ng ot virtual :1nt.tmt1an and baptJ..>, ttlllde, a1 post.-
lea 1n ipao exercitio aotua coaitat10 e1ua ad alia rapiatur, ex virtute primae 
lint.entiCllia perficit.v sacraent. __ n6 
Let. it be Doti.ed that. 1be phra .. !2. !HI !. virtual intention does not 00-
~ur_ !! int!!u:l yiJi!!alllaoat l1ear17 approaches it.a equivalent, or perhaps !! 
.reter T1rtll!Hl'- But, atr.1.Uy ~kin" CI'l. doea not. lI&ke a virtual intentim, 
/" -----
I&a CD. might oorreot,q be aa1cl to make an actual intention. One acts'!.i1l! a 
lvirtual int_ti_, or one .2Y. a virtual int.tIltion in his aetim.7 
Th ... who are t_Uiar with the vocabulazoy or It. Thana. might 1f'811llOnder 
IWhether or not be here __ a virtual no dUtel'Gnt17 tram his us. o£ it in such 
jph ...... as. ·each thill, aiat. virt.u.al.ly in 1t.8 principle, ,,8 "both utter and 
,If •• preex1a\ ."iriuall7 :in God, as :1a the pr~.rd1al cause of both,·9 and uwh_ 
" 
the tora of 811 etfect 18 Tirt~ in ita cauae, it 18 like its active caus. aa 
regarcia all that. ewer which t.he ponr of t.hat caUl8 extends.alO 
4!.I., I-II, 1, 6 ad J. 
oS.!!. If !!!!!., lS, a, a, 4 801. 
6 
.!.!_, III, 64, 8 ad l. 
7 Cit. 1b14. Bere "hab1tulla 1Dtentiot' 1 ... eel tor y1rtual intention. 
-8 !_!_, I, 93, 1 c. 
9~., U7, ) c. 




St. fh .... t om explantian i. tOlJl'ld beat in the- c..mt& !!!. ~ !Jm"eace • 
.. i. an •• ring two d1f't1CJultie. about prayer& the tir.t cOIltencia that apparent-
fJ.7 • un 1_ to Pl"&7 without oeasing. the aecond argue. that actual attmtion 
..... a necessitl' in pra,er. Hi. repl,. to the t1rst begin. by stating two ...,.. 
in whioh an,- aot i. aaid to endure. aaut .ecundum e._anU_. aut secundum. virtu-
t., ai ... e .tt.ctua eua. e10ut mo\io • .1ue qui lap1d_ pro.1101t, durat per ...... 
U. actu d_ unua lapidi .ovando appenit. aed Yirtlll JIOUan1a un .... da lapia 
ex ri. 1IIpule1C1l1. priJaae Jlovetur.aU Th. he app11e. the principle to the pro1>-
1_ of pra18l', which 1. of intereat here because it exaaplifies how the principlA 
will b. applied to other situation. alao. -Similiter et1aa dico quod orationi. 
dvatic pote.t duplioiter GOI1ld..derari. Vel aecnmdua 88sent.ia actus. Et de DOl 
debet aliClu1 •• <attnue Ol"8l'8 .el .eaper, quia oponet eU_ interdum cirea alla 
aoc'Gp&ri.. Vel .. etmd_ v1:rt1l'tea. It a1c ejUi 'Y.1rtua praee ipue qwmtum ad eu1 
_1n1tilll llaDet in caliDUS operi.bua alii. quae tac1Drwl, ordinate, quia omnia aci Ti-
tam .. tea_ habenda oJ."dinazoe debeaus. It 1.deo ._ider1a rltae aetemae quod 
" 
eat orat1C1'd. pr:1nelpi_, unet in amibua operibua Doni. aeeundum ... irtu'_. It 
propter hoo 41c1tur in 01081& I lb. ..... tliClll ce ... t orare q\U non ce •• at bale 
agere. t tlU 
To reply to the second d1ttioult,. St. Thoma. returnl to the distinction he 
haa made, and nOir introduoe. a third el_mt to cOlIplete the picture, nam.ely, 
aining in habit. -Sicut tm1a diet_ est, al.1qui. actua unet per essenti_ et 
virtute qundoqueJ led quaudoque trana1t acta et mmet Virtute, sieut in ex __ 
Ul!. n !!21., lS, 4, 2, l .01. 
12lbid• 
-
lQ de project1cm. lapidi. patmt. it.ic man.1"8 act_ in virtute eat quldaa 
dilll modua inter 1p._ •••• 111 habltu et in aot1.1.J quia quod ill habltu eat, 
aque Yirtute n.qu. per ... ent1ala actus e.t. Seeundta hoc ergo dico quod. att ..... 
io in oration. aanere debet a_per ae,nandtlll T1rtut_ •• ed nOll requiritur quod 
per JR.eat per •• aent1aa. actua .... lJ 
IBaediateq he prooeede to the object1ona, and hi. thiJ:'d and fourth respon-
ae. giye further olar.Uication of hia lJIlderatanding at this virtuality. -Ad 
erti. diAulilld'ta quod ucendi t intelleatu. in Dea, ,uando oration. ad De_ 
ordinavit, et Yin. Uliu aacenau. in to'. orat100.e anet. Ad q'llal"tlB die ... 
_ ClUod in openb_ virt.U_ nOll QPortet quod .-per actuali_ electio adait, 
cut non oportet quod 1J.le qui el .. ~am dat, seaper de 81e_.,... oogttet, 
d pftio1t .... l oopt ........ l .. o~ dare diapo811:l:~J nisi cClDtraria 
oCitat1c. praeoe4eDa in\8nt10 1nt.rruapatur • ..l4 
Th.refo", how does It. tho .. -under nand. a virtual 1ntent1oat Ie .... it 
the continued ex1atencs of the actual int_t1cnin it. effect. !he actual 
, 
tantian i. Dot pr •• 8.1t iu.lt, but its Wlu*,ce and cauaat10n raaaine. ·the 
~tio 18 Yinuall, beeau. ~. acrtuJ. int_tion is le ..... ing it.1apNas OIl the 
13 . ... ' Ibid •• 4 _01. In the a_ book of the ,QGlUDtm' 16, 2, 2, 2aol., St. 
homaa u;e. the triple d1v1a101'l tor the act ot .ontd onJ but thsre the appl1-
atlQ.D 4itfer. al1,htl~ and. the lIiddl. (v1rt~!) .... an 8UJIlpla of an inter-
retat.1ys tntenticlu -LC]ontritio poteat _cipi tripl1c1terc .,.e1 actu, vel habi-
W, 't'el alld10 modo. labitu '1111_ eontrit,10 aKutan •. nan autt1cit ad peceat1 
en1alla d:1Jl1 •• 1cm_ ..... I. it.ena requiritur quod semper 81t actual1, con-
ritioJ qu:l.a e •• retur quoci p8C<Jat.lII quod qui, in m-.or1a vel in cognit1.e nCll 
8t, r81tti nan po ... t. .It ideo diceruba quod. requiriturcontr1t10 _dio 
o,4,11oInd.o ae1l.iCJet etei &ctu peccata non d1eplioeat explicit., d:1apl1cet 
en implic1teJ quia ex virtute '-ot .. quam agtt, aequeretur dtapl1cent1a expl1-
ita peceat1 ven:1al1a., ai cogitat.io ad mud. ferretur .. -
14lD If Sent., 15, 4, 2, 4, ad. 3 ad ad 4. 
---
tic at hand. A virtual intention then (it the term _y be ued, tor St. Tho-
s .... to b._ avoided the term) designate, the causative infiuen.e ot the 
tual intentiCill. To say, aA.ll one needs 1. a Yirt.ual :Intention," 18 to .ean 
bat "All OI'le neecla i. for the ro:rce, or infiuenc., ot the actual. intention to 
Il"VllUUiJI." Thua, -rtrtually to refer .omething t.o God" (e.g., an act of alaap.v-
81gn11'i.. that, thoup one doe. not now have an ut.ual :l.DtentiCll ot God. a. 
e end, still QUe t. ebo1ce, deliberation, use, and other act. of the will and 
the intellect are truly being referred to God. beeauae ot the 1n1'll81ce of the 
tual intention. I:a. u habit.ual reference of an act of alJuciT:ing to God, co 
the other had, the ,1vm, of alJlls 1a in no wi .. being referred to God. Better 
o S&7 that the w1ll (Iloe had referred t.he act to God, bs now the will i. anl.7 
apoaed 1n a certa1n W&7 toward. d1recttag tbe act of alII.r! T1na to God. 
It W'Ol1lcl be 4uite pos.ible, but also quite moorreot, to UDderpcd Y1rtu-
&II apprNOhing verT near17 :i.n mean1ag to p!!_t1aJ.1. J 111 thi. 8&8e the 1ft-
ention 1f01Ild. be virlual1. becau.ae it doe. Bot &Ot\1&lly ai,t. but. i. Dear to 
. '. 
" 
stenee beG a._ of the as..t.ence ot 1t. ca.... (s). It 18 this ... mc ... 111g 
ch 18 IOlUld 1n tbe phraae. quoted near tbe beginninl or W. ohapter, all 01 
hioh d •• onbe an elteet aa 'rirtual.l7 existing in ita prineiple. Betore thi. 
hapter i. eru.d, how .... er, it will be clear that It. Thoau, when Ulling yin ..... 
a in connection with the intention, \1I:\deratanc1a it aecord1ng to the tirst 
an1ag explained) that 18, as the continued existence of the actual 1ntention 
in it. cauaaticm. The aeccmd aeaning grenada what 1. called the interpret&UT. 
tentiOD. a Vpe which St. Tbeau did not con8ider, but. wh10h will shoJ'tl.y come 
up tor diacuas1cz. again 1n this and in the tollOWing chapter. 
Great care must be uaed in interpreting any })Usage in which St. fhcmaa 
--
S2 
~plo:r. theae three terma of !Ctua1;tl, viri!!Ul. and bab1 ttraUl. lint ot all, 
his cOIltemporar1a., CaJetan tells us, were ua:in& ba~tul when we would now eq 
virtual, and St. ThCll1&8 saaetimes accaamodated h1mael.t to the current uaage.lS 
Seccm.dl:y,. the 'term actual. often s1t1lifie. both actual and v:1rtual.16 !hue It. 
thoma. att1l'118 the iapo •• ibillty of a lUll'S continual actuJ. repen.tance becau .. 
.. 
sleop )I'Qat inte:rrapt.11 Ap.in, he states that the preeept 111)0 everything for 
the glOl'7 at' Ood- can se. that an "aotuali. Nlatio in DetIfJI sit conjunct. act:l.-
oni noat.l"8e clt111bet, DOll quidfllll in a.etu, sed in T1rtute, secundum quod virtu 
pr1Jl&e ordination1s unet 1n OIIInibua actiC31ibua sequent1bu8, &icut .t virtu. t1-
~i. 1lltill1 manat in CIIIl1bua t:inibua ad ip8UIl ordinaUs.-lS 
Thirdly, .s alreadJ pointed out, the notiC31 of virtuality- can 1t.elt ev<*e 
confusion. Thus, arq actul intention can tty1rtuallT' embraoe under its wUIed 
object .ometb:1na which the m:1nd bas not attended to :I.n :l.t. dellberat:l.cm., but 
which 1. trul.:r connected with that object. 'the mind· could then bl ve an inter-
pretative intention of that object. Du:' wbm, the mind has attended to an end 
• 
and the means to the end, then torget. the cdr and goe. about the execution ot 
the 11"" theD tbat latter acticm. i. be in, executed with a "vlfl.wU- intenti<m. 
~though the d1tterenoe bet.en the two Jlea.n1nga ma:r not 1810 clearly be .een, a. 
lmg .. it i. rea_bend that when "'rirtual" 1, uaed by St. Thomas to de_ribe 
a type at 1ntentiCll 110 clGe, Dot .ean exactl:y the .... as when ulfsd in other 
conn_101m., c QDfu1C11 will be aTo1d.ed. ngard1ng thi. particuJa 1" word. 
1S2.Pera Os~, ed. Leonina, with Oajetan'. cOllllentary (Rome, 1888-1906), 
XII, $). 
16Ib1d., lX, }80, VI, 1). -(S]_per appeten8 quod e.t ad tin_, appetlt ti-
n_ nOlilii.b1tuallter, sed aetualltel', ut extend1t 8e ad actauliter 810 v1rtua11te .It 
17!.!., III, Sh, 9 •• 
lA" _ .. A. L I..... .. .3."lt. ::::. .. - =.~., .. -. "' "', 
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Having noticed seae aspects ot the, notion and a t_ of it. usages, the next 
~tep ie to examine more thorough~ the nature ot Ttrtua11ntention. be acnel. 
,iema could~be dran trom the citatime alre&d;y .. de, But another text or WO 
giy .. 111 tall at thi. point will a.semble all the itl __ t. and occasion a .ub .... 
quent 8ftalya,ie or all the factors in this type at intention. the texts will zoe-
'fer to theolOgical "3-te. Though uttere or theolog haye no place in a 
~Uo,oph1cal etudy, ,.et their trequent 1I1tl"l1S1ca cannot be entiJ"ely eliminated 
_hell ODe ie tr)'ing to fe""et out the philosoph, ot St. Thca.aa concealed in hi. 
the ole&?, • All cae oan do ie JUke the neoe.aar.r ... tal adaptations trca the 
q.stiens Ulel the exampl .. being rw1 .. d b7 'Ule Angelio Doctor. 
la this tint pas .... , the topic under diacuasion is that fadliar them.e ot 
lorin, CIocl. An 0\)3_t1ca baa be_ raiee4 to the eftect that all oar act8 Jauet 
be retened ""'G&l.q to God, and not -reJ.:r habitual17. St. tb .. s atlpel'8t 
(S]1cut ill cauie etf1clentlbua virtue pri1l&e causae _~t in ta1ibus cau-
si, aequentlbUII, ita etiam intent10 principa.lis tini. virtute unet in 
-.1bua .t1n1bus aecUftdarii., Uftde qu1cua.qu. actu intendit al1quem finem. 
eeeundpiUll, virtute intend1t finem pririclpal_; sieut aedicus, d1a colli-
lit herbaa actu, intend it cant:loere pot1m., rdbil tort..,818 de sanitate 
cOgitans, virtual1ter tamen intendit aanitat_, propter qUIll potion. date 
Sic igit'Ul", OUlll &liquis a.lp8- orciinat in n.., siout in tinem., 1n 
C8nibUli quae propter aeipaua· tacit. unet virtute mtent:lo ultiai finia, qui 
Dna eat, _de 18 canibvs .. ren poteat, ad. oar1 tat. h&beat. • • • 
. Ad teri1a dicendlm, quod aliud est hfb1tual1ter reterre in Dewn, at 
al1ud Yirb&lJ.ter. Babltv.al.lter enD retert 111 De. at qui nihil ag1t, nee 
&liquid actualiter intend!t, ut. dormienaJ aed YirtWlliter &liquid rererre 
:lD lea, en -aenUa propter tina ordinantla in llea. U'Ade hablilualiter 
reterre in Deum, ncn cadit aub praecepto J .. d v1nu&llter reterre c:wda in 
llelB, oadit IU.b ~.pto caritat1a' eua hoc n1h1li al1ud ait quaa habere 
Data ult:1mura finem.19 . 
the secCl'ld text, alao alread7 seen in part, occurs in an explanaticm ot the 
:1ntent1m ... h1ch a minister need. tor the validity of a sacraent. It oOllee as 
19 De Oar1 t •• ll. ad. 2 and ad. 3. 
S4 
a repq to the obJeet1cm that intEmt:l.m bear. CIll7 on wha~ i. attended to, anel 
lack ot attent:l.OI1 to one'. worela or act. 1. a CCIIIIlcn pbencaenon (the 1lIp11cation 
being that o ... quentq the naber ot valid. 8&OraMnt. would be III&ll :l.ndeed). 
the reply. a[t] i.et me qu:l. allud cog:l.tat, 1'1_ babeat aotual. intmt:l.OIl., 
habet t_1Il habitual .. , quae euttic:l.t ad pertection •• acraent1: puta a, 0_ 
aac.rdoa acc.dit ad bapt1Hnc:lull, :l.nt_d1t tuere c1rca bapt1unciua quod tacit 
lool.l1a. UIlde,.1 poaiea 111 ipso .e1'01Uo act. cogitaUo e:l.ua ad alla rapia-
tur, ex ftnut. priaae iDtentim1a pertic1tur aacnaent_. Qum-i •• tudio.e 
curare deb.' aaeraenU a1n1.ter ut .U_ actuala intenUCileJI adhib.at. Sed. 
boc n(ll1 total1 kr e.t pod t_ 111 nfa1n1lr pot.natel qu:l.a praeter 11'1"-t1 __ , 
.UIIl h_o vult alt_ :l.Dtmden, inc1p1t alla oogitar •• • 20 
"Una With a virtual 1nt_tian involve., 'Ulentore, tbree P870holog1oal 
activities •• peoiaJ.l7t an order:I.Dg of naaoft, a IlaUUq of dtent1on, md a 
.ertain ccmUBu.t101l of ~. aot1_ of \h. will. laeh of tbe.. diaalda 01081' 
inapeoUon • 
" 
..... orden. It .... a n-.r of MIm."" being oClllllllOted With. directed 
to, the end. It.o &rI'IIlp. the • __ and the end tor the will tbAn the latter 
move. to t.he end 11' 1t ...... to an7 ot tho.e ..... 1_. thia or4al'iaB ot .... 
ad end aut preo •• the _tual tnt_t101l. Bat. t.hi. OrMriD, alao POOUldathe 
ponib1l1V of a .... quant nnw intent.icm, beea •• it the will doe. ftot·_ove 
to dea1re t.be .... bee .... !t l!!! relation !! !!!!. - .. !2!!!. :l.ntmded md. 
the ,he &cu. ot the 1I1ll in DO wq toll .. "in v1rtu or" the "tirat" OJ" 
actual intent1on. For ODO. t.b1s _ov. b ... been .... anet the wUl proe .... to be 
ss 
uay about the .ana, the will no longer is dea1ring what i. known to be related 
to the cd, bu:t dewes what is, in fact, rela'hd to the end. Thi. ie what 1. 
slgnit1ed by St. fhcaas' e.xaaple of the doctor'. Yirtual intention, and by the 
rda, "rtnuaU.ter aliquid referre in Daua, eat agentl. propter fin_ ordinanti 
in Dna,· a. \he .. _orda are to be lIDcler.tood in the 11sbt of the flnt port1on 
ot that oltatic:a. 
It 1. of the utaoat iaporbnoe to notice caretul17 the dUtol'll1ce between 
sq1a" -the rill deatre. wbat is lmOM1 to be rela'\ed to the end, n and, "the 
w:Ul deatres what 1." in taat, related to the end.. n In the toaer 1Ilataace, the 
.oult. dq1r:l.DC what 1t a. the .... Uae _. with 1t. intellec' 1. referred to 
au cd, in the a8Oolld, the soul. la d.eatriac lOIlething (the brewiaC ofa aed:l.ci-
nal d.r1Dk tor example) which baa !!. tacto b_ll ordered b7 the .01Il to the pro-
cnl~t of hdlth, bu\ lle1ther that p&rticral.ar order to t!ae end nor the _d 
ltselt 1a at the t1ae be:1Da .en b7 the atoll .. t. 
In the fOI'Mr 1nata.e, tur\hermore, the object being deaired ia al.o be1D1 
ordered P87chol.ciCal.l.7 to the end, in the ... orul, the object being .. aired i. 
no laqer ps),chologicall7 (bJ the att_tlon ot the intellect) ordered to the 
act, but 1. eoaeh- po .... aed. of a _ real1 ty b7 reason of the prenoWt ordina-
tl_. Durin, 'he pqcholoc1oal ord.er1nathe int.eU80t .upplants ill the 1ntc-
ti«lal order the proper lora or the obJen (the .... ) with the tom of the IIld, 
.0 that _. the Pll7chologtoal awarene.. ot the end and. ot the order to the end. 
p ..... and the aO'Ul bule. It.elt with the .... , thi. lat'ter haa a different 
yalue f~ what lt had prior to the ord.eri.a,. For ~ eat. of oonYeD1ent di .... 
cr1Jl1natiCl'l b.u.en the two inat&l1O •• , let the t!rat be •• 1pated. a. a pQCho-
logical order ot the _an. to the end, and. let the .econd be d •• ipated. a. an 
ootological order of the Ileans to the end. rra. the viewpoint ot the end'. 
function, then, the first oan al80 be designated .. a pQ'Cholog1cal intol'll&tia 
of the mean. by the end, and the ... ond as an CIltololioal intoJ'llatiOll. !'hi, 
final point deaerve, further di.cUllaiCil1. 
Ontolog1oally, the end intOI'lU the .ean. which hat been ordered to it in 
the or4er at tinal causalit,., beeau .. the end i, the r ..... tor de.iring the 
__ •• ft. ThOll... repea'" thi. many t:bae. and in aany lppl1oatiCD.8. For 
exaple. wPJ.nia at_ ocaparatur ad iel quod ordJDatur ad tina, ,1out torma ad 
:materi_,·21 and "Ix tine aut. 8ID1\ur ,\1&81 toruli. ratio Tolendi illud quod 
ad tin. ol"d1natur.-22 Becauae ot this relaUcu, the will can be directed to 
the aeans bee a,," it w1lls 1n th_ the end.2) The end and the aean8 8Clual •• 
object tor the will.2Jt further, when a un intends a proximate end (whioh ia 
.quiTalent to a ..... to the reaot. end), h. lIltende both end, at the _. tille, 
21 !.!., I-II, 4, 4 o. 
Ilnlc:l., 19, 10 o. Cf. alao the appl1catlCl1l to the aayinl, "Firat in :1D-
tentlan;-eiO.-, 1, 1 ad 1J 1, ) 0 and 4 0, lB, 7 ad 2, 2$, 2 OJ 84, 2 0 ••• 
23Ibid., 8, 2 0 t -. T.ro CIU. PDt ad tina, DOll armt berta Tel. TOllta 
~ropter _ipaa, aed ex ord1ne ad nn.. (hade TolUDtu in •• non. tertur, nl.i 
!!I_tenu tartur in tin._ unde hoc ipaua quod in ei. vult, .st tiDi •• - Ibid., 
~ c. a[cJ_ 1'1nia At _ada .. TOllta, id aut_ quod e.t ad tiD_, 1nqunt_ 
tluJ:a.odi, nOll alt Tollt. Di,l propt.r tin •• manUe.t •• trt quod TOl_t&8 p0-
teat terri in fin., aine hoc Clued teratur in •• que nnt ad tin.. eed in ea 
quae .unt ad tin_, inqunt_ hi_odi, nan pote.t t.rri, ni.l t.r.tur in ip •• 
'in •• " 
2~ 'er., 22, 14, ad 2, ad " and ad 4. !.!., I-n, 12, h ad 2t - (rJ m:1a, 
!lnquatua iiii rea quatlda, est al1ud volUDtati. obiect_ ._ ld quod elt ad 
rtn-. Sed 1Ilquanta eat ratl0 Tolen.di ld quod etrt .d tin., est 1Dl_ et id_ 
pbiect_.-
au the mixing of a aedicine and the giving of health. ,,2S 
iiOW' again, thie informing of mean. b)" the end was .een at nece.8&17 to the 
actual intentiCll. liow d088 it differ for the virtual intentian? The an .... r, 
though not ... st. !hau. expre •••• it, 1. that in actual intention the ontologi-
cal intormation at the _an, by the end 1, acccapanied by the p.ychological in-
format.iCll of the mean. b)" the end, whereas in virtual int.ention the cntologioal 
ordering obtain., but not the plQ'Chological. By the ontological intorutian, 
the aea. are de81rable b;y reaaon at the de,1rabilit.:r cd the end, nOlI" the attan-
tion can remain aware of thi. intonaation, eo, tbat the will will, the and in the 
mean., or the att.ention of the intellect can awern tram consideration Df the 
cd and IhUt to the ""'" ccaa1dering the .ee. now &8 an end in it.. own right 
to which -ana are beiq ordered, 111 which oa .. the will cannot will the end 
tir.t int.ended. !he preeence ot the peychololical awarene .. of, the end and: the 
d •• iN of the endaark the actual intention, in contra., to the virtual intc-
tion t s absence of • .,h ptqUho1og1cal direeU<)Il to the end. 
In the warda ot st. Thc:aa. the idea i. stated in this manner. -(AJd hoo 
quod alicujua action!. t1nIs ait Deus vel charitae, nOll oportet quod agendo 11-
].a actiana aliqui. de Deo vel eharitate cogitetJ Bec iterum suttieit quod ali-
quia in habitu tantua Deua at charitatem habeat, quia sic etiam act.. veniali. 
peceati allqui. in Des ordinaret, quod f'alslJll eat: sed oportet quod prius 
2S~.!., I-II, 12, 3 e. Ct. al.o 1, 15, 2 oJ £.Q., III, 17; and George P. 
nubenau I.J. , -the Unit)" of JbaaD Aotivi"7," Io4ern Schoolllan.. XXVII (Jan-
uary, 19S0), 78-79. "lb all volmtary action the eFta 18 loiiil. _.; • • Conse-
qu-u, .,.erJthins perUiDina "0 \he _d 1. tamal in 'the 1d.ll _". ADd thu. 
the saae act, when ordered to one end, i. under the fora at virtue; when to 
ano'ther, unde .. 'the tom of 'rice. • •• And the aat of one 'rioe, ordered to the 
end at another, reoeives the latter', tom." 
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tuerit elogitatio de fine, qui est charitas vel Deus, et quod ratio actiones se-
quentes in hWlC tinem ordinaveritJ ita quod reotitudo illius ordinationia in 
actionibu8 eequentibus salvetur: ut patet in examplo quod Ancenna ponit de ar-
titiee, qui, ai dum opus auum exerceret, sEmper de regula artis oog1taret, 
multum in opere iIlpediretur; sed sieut prius exeogitaVit per regula. artis, 1 ta 
postaodua operatur.u26 The ordering to the end 1. the important Udng. This 
idea was also expre8sed in the words, "Sic igitur, CUll aliquis seipaum ordinat 
in De_. s!cut in fin_, .in aan1bus quae propter seipsUlJl tacit manet virtute 
intentio ultiai tinis, qui Daus est.,,21 It is taken tor granted that the atten-
tic:n is not focused upantbe last end, God, or else there would be no talk of a 
virtual intention but. ot an actual intention. 
the attention, therefore, shifts. The JDind may become attentive to the 
.. ans, or to what leads to the execution ot the means, or to objeete oompletely 
unconnected with the_an.. The eDJIples of St. Theaaa on this point, and even 
hi. explicit stat.ent ot the fact, seem to juatif'y thi. interpretation. lor 
, . 
.. ple, we haTe seen already that the intentiOn abides virtuall.ywhen a man who 
begins to pray tor scae worthy Objective SOCl'! alipa oft into reverie.28 Aga1n, 
it is not neo •• sary tor "eme who ie walking alcng the road, tI says St. Themas, 
26 !!!. n .!!!!., )8, 1, 1, ad 4. 
27 S.T., III, 64, 8 ad 3. 
--
28In IV Sent., lS, 4, 2, 4 sol.; and 6, 1, 2, 1, ad 4: "[Q)uamvis lI.1niste-r 
sacramenii debeat niti ad custodiendum cor SUUIII. quantum. potest, ut maxime in 
verbis saoraaumtalis tormae intentiooem habeat actualem, quia tamen cogitatio 
est valda 1abills, etia si tunc nan adsit actualis intentio quando verba pro-
~ertJ dl1Dllllodo priusintendarit et contrari& intentio non internmer1t, a&cramen-
tm non 1mpeditur, quia operatur tunc in vi princ1palis intentionis. Jon enilll 
oportet quod in opere semper intentio eonjungatur in actu, sed surricit quod 
OPUS ab intentione prooedat." 
>9 
""0 be tb:JDkinl of the ed at flYer'1 nep.·29 A. a _ttar of taot, .en cannot 
J»h7e1ologioall,. and P81Oholog1call7 aamta1n cOIlt:rol of their att_tiOll, which 
hu the thinking jn abort order alOllI diTereet Un •• wheth.r tbe,. will 1t or 
no.l° What i. aore, at tiJUts a lUll U torced del1b.rat.ly to re11nqutah his 
attatic to the anel 01 richt rea .. and allow 1t a dinraoUOIl tor the sak. o.t 
riabt reason. "Ion c1Jl •• t contrarta T1rluU .1 raticm1a actus allquando 
1Dt.ra1tut1lr al1q,uo quod .eo1llldD raU __ lit. al1oqa1n, quod a11qai ... 
s_o tradit, .... t contra T1rtut_ • .Jl 
IINnwhUe, when the attention or the intelleot shins t1'Oll the end to the 
aM'1., the 1Dtel11g1hle 8Pec1.s ot both the end and the aot o.t mtction 1tself' 
are reta1Ded. in the p.sa1bl. 1ntellect, wh.re \b.,. are ready lor recall at an,. 
t:1ae the peraon wtahe.. To r ..... hi. at_tim, he hu CIIllT to .... ok. the tug. 
o.t hi. put act1G11, and repeat hi. desire of that end. 
The acttnt,. ot the wID ocmUDu.s. Ita consolou object no l(1\,.r is the 
ad 1ntanded actualq, but tbe .... (UDder ~tch tea MY also b. 1acluded. 
.. 
both the enenor ad the tnt.r.t.OI" acts 01 the" per8Oll) • It no lODger 1. w1ll1ng 
tha _an. ior the cd, &s in actual intention, but 1. 1d.ll1D.g .... which are, 
iD tact, ordered to the encl. It cannot w111 the order .,11c1t17. this ordering 
18 not baing at\endecl '0 b,. tbe inteUect, ancl .0 not being propoaec1 b7 the 
intellect to the wID. 
Let 1t b. notH, in ctmleot1on with this point, that the _ .. er to a 
29!.!., I-II, 1, 6 ad J. 
JOe.t. !.!., nI, €>b, 6 ad J; !'! IV !!!!., 6, 1, 2, 1, a4 4, !!?!!., lS, 4, 
2, 4, in contr. 
J1S.f., II-II, 1$3, 2 ad 2. 
--
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pl'Oble d1acuaed aAn7 tiua by a. Thaag,ll n.ely, the Bingle mot1en of the 
rill to the lIleaDe and to the end, baa In appl.1cat1on to Tinual intention. That 
i., the will continue •. to 1nte.nd the aeana and the end ill one and the ... 
aoti", beo .... -Quado Tol_taa tenur in 1d quod eet ad t1n_, pro'lrt est ad 
fin_, 1d quod .at ad fin_ non e.t tera1nua ejua. et ideo 1101'1 opoJ"tet quod e1nt 
ibi cluo m*a ... ll St. !haa. i. -.peald.ng here exPNsa:q or a.'l actual intention, 
but it AD alao be .&14 of the "f'1rtual int_tlem that, "when \he will i. borne 
to that which i. tor the end, insofar aa it ia tor the end, that .Mch ia tor 
the end i. not ita to .... M !he diltercoe in the two intentim., again, cemaiat. 
in the tact t .. :&eiie actual intentim involv .. both a PS7ChOi;a~a"5 and an onto-
logical .ovaIent riaht up to the cd, whereas the nnw intention haa onl7 the 
ontological movement to the end. Willing .. bat i. ordered for an end beeaWle ot 
an onp.nal deaire otthat end, constitute. the ontologioal JIlw.ent. W1lling 
what 18 ordered. for an end together with an ex:pl1cit d.eaire at that end, em-
.titut •• ontolO£1oal and P87Chologioal aov_e.nt. It ... ill be ahom "'817 SOOIl in 
the next chapt.r that, tor St. !hca.as, this Oft'ologieal centlnnt,.- ot 1Il0tion 
grounds the aoral 'Value of the Vin11&l intenttan. Without this Woming of the 
ilUan. b;y the end, .0 that a aan·. rill is cotolol1call,. borne to both t.he one 
land the other, the theor.r of ft. Thaaa. on the moral influence ot the virtual 
intention 18 unJustU1&ble. 
In .... ary, tben, it baa beel aeen that the'rirtual intention of an end 
Plalude. several charuter18Uc el_ent.. "'8011 haTing ordered JH&Il8 and end 
32 ,l. De Ver., 22, ~. lD II Sant., )8, 1, b. 
....... .......-.. .....-
S.T., I-II, 12, 4 • 
II lD II Sent., 16, 1, b, ad 2. 
- -
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in preparation tor the actual. intention, the ontological llod1f'ioation ot the 
mean. by the end :reaa1ruJ when the att«ltion ot the intellect haa shitted tram 
the end. The cd and the act ot intention, nOlI' no longer t.he objects ot the 
intellect t 8 gas., became speci •• :in the _01'7. The will, ta1t.htul to its 
natural dependeGe on the intellect, bueie. itself with the .. an. and 1d. th the 
mean. to the ••• eana. lh do:lng 80, howeYer, ita motion doe. not t.erminate 
<mtologioallT in the ".a, but really embrace. at the .... till. the end. 
CHAPTER IV 
VIImJAL IRTEITIO}h ITS INFLUENCE 01 .A. MORAL Act 
The preceding chapter haa explained the notion and the nature of 'firtual 
intention. Among the moat important element. in that type ot intention .s 
found to be the matter-fom raJa tionsh1p of the Ileana 8'ld the end. The present 
chapter undertakes an expl&natiC1l of the intluence of the virtual intention on 
a man'" lIl0ral acts, and will begin by showing the consequence. of that _.e 
lIlS.tter-tom relaticnship. thEIl the study will proceed to those clrcUllst;anoe., 
a.+ready noticed, which aocidentally affect the lIloral val.ue of an act.; namely, 
attention and intensity. Finally the subject ot the renewal of the aetul in-
tention avring to the 10s8 of that "force of the first intention" wUl be treated 
to indicate why and when a renewal ot actual intention may be nece.sa;ry. 
Once again the texts ot St. Thcmaa may be a source ot difficulty. They 
will often speak of such things as lIlent, grace, charity, venial and mortal sin. 
The author of this thesis certainly would prefer to have nothing to do with 
supernatural theology I but the texts ot at. Thomas have to be used. The author 
has tried to use only those texts which can allow ot some natural equivalent of 
the supernatural matters contained therein. Thus, venial and mortal sin DlIlY be 
understood .s bad moral acts which, respective17, do not destro,- ordination to 
the laat end and do destroy such order) meritoriousne.s in the natural order IU9 
be under.toad a. the lIl0ral value ot an act which further. the agent t., worthiness 
of natural beatitude. what is said of charity can be unde~.tood of natural chaJ'oo 
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6) 
It7 ad aq otten be true of p~.. Anytb.tD, a&1d ot arace, of oOlU"ae, 0 __ 
~ be Nduaecl to a nat1lnl appl,lo .. t1ca, aDd eo ten. 10 whioh Vd. reali')'fl .... 
urea h~ have been aYo1ded. With thea. oautiClD8 1n m1ad, thm, \he .. lDa-
ti_ of nrtual 1ntentiClD oan continue. 
!beN 1 ... tOJ'Ce frCIII .. t1nt iD'HDtlOD, It. 'lhaaa ..,.., wb10h can rema1D 
in ,he action w1110h tollon. low 1t would ... troa exper1ence tbat tb1s torce 
~ 1D GDe at twa wq8. either '0 that the wm 1a OCl'l'UnUiq It. acU. 
CD the JI88Zl8 wttb the _O~I attenticm of '-he iDtel.lee' '0 ilhe __ s cd 
\0 the wUl'. opent1OD aD the mean'J or ao that the w1ll o-Un._ ita uUcm 
GD the .... , without tbe .. ".ticm or \be intellect. Itt the latter 0"', It 18 
aUll , __ that the acent act. by tONe ot the •• ual in_Uon, but hi. aoUcma 
ue cUTin alCl18 'iIler\lJ" or a1lbctoa.c1CNa17, or pe.1bap. b7 cHnt ot babit, 111 
the eocuUQIl of the _UCla, N:tJ»r tbm with the .e .... tlo JMt1cm of the to ... 
c.... !hu, tor 8UIlple, a prieat who 18 repeatmc ,h1a • .,.aa1al. prqer. or 
pel'fON1D, ~oulv ritul _tion. OaD e1tt.-r 'be JHQ1na 010 •• at_'lento b1a 
" 
orde ed moU'*I, or hi. aiad oan ha .... wcdered tar..-" le&Tinl b1a habits '0 
oA1'17 _ the ptq.~ eaapleUoa of hi. clut1... In both ..... tbe uti. pro-
0'" bJ Yirtue of __ or1.1Dal 1nt.tlC1l m.ac1e 'b7 the prleat betore bel1nn1nc 
tbe t'URCtloaa. ., ill contrast to the ._rl8\l8 pe1"4urance at the tonae of the 
1D the at'kntt .... \11'1_, the ltOat that MIl be aa1d ot the 1u.ttentin 
t7Pe of actiri_ 1e that. the aot1ClD It.elf 1, ordered to the end intended, tbe 
aot eftA be1rJ& act1vel¥ applied to that. action, wbUe the d1apoa1t1cm of 
the will rem.ina the &181M ... bef.'ore nth regard to the md :Intended. 
~t. ... h dUterencea, the aoral Talue of both the •• types ot acUon 
~rt __ d b7 ... 'ri.rt.'u or tOl'O" ot an _twalinteotl_ a. euetlJ equal, 9S. 
itself, to the moral value of the I.e acti~ it perfol'Md w1th an actual 1ntc-
[\iOl1. • [1] n QllUbua _tibus mer:L torUa, qui ord1nantur ad fin. rectua, . nOll re-
,u1r1tur quod !ntentio &gentia ocmjUllptur tW, lecuncbmt qu.al.1bet act •• 86d 
lYia pri.Jla, quae movet intentionem, manet in toto opere • • • et haae priaa ril 
tacit tot_ OPUI mer:Ltori_, wl1nterrumpatv per contrariaa affection_, quae 
diverut a tine praedicto ad finem oClltrarl:um.·1 IIlat auta triple x ettectua 
oraticmil. Praua quidela oamnuniIJ omnibus aatlbua carttate intomat1s, quod eat 
rmereri_ it ad huDo etfect_ nct1 ex neces.itate requirltur quod attantl0 adsit 
oratlcm1 per totum, led. ria primae intentlon1. qua al.1quia ad oranda &Ccedi t, 
rer1d1t tota oration. _r.t:tori8lltt slout jn &1.11, mer1ton1, act1bua accid1t.·2 
All that st. 'hamaa aqs in th.,. pas-S •• , 1t i. true, is that the acUons 
per.t01'lled with a Virtual 1Dtentioo ,are aeritoriwal be doea not MY that thq 
equal the aoral wortk of the same actical perlol'lled With an actual. 1ntfl'ltlon. 
But, arguing trca the fact that the -n. prima- II ,aid to reuin so as to haft 
the .. e effect &II U 1 t were still "aov1ng ~he intention- and fraa ft. !beau' 
teaching concern1ns the TaUdit,- of o.rtain ...oraents, 1t sa .. sate to aq 
that the action per!omed in virtue or m actual intention of itaelt equala- the 
value of the ..... acti<D under an actual intention (although accidentally, a. 
11111 be seen, the latter can bave more value than the torm.r). 
The reasons tor this are two. me en the part ot the w:l.11, and one on the 
part or the object will.d, in this Case the means. Both aspects bave alread7 
been explained. The will continues its efficient motion, or at leaat retains 
11 .!.2 .9.2£., c. 14, leet.) (lied.). 
2!_!., II-II, 8), U c. 
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ta incl1natlO11 to the •. ul by not :1ntenclmc an oppoai te end. !he meana are ,tl 
ol'll8d. b7 the cd, :lna __ h .. reason haa subordinated the .eana to the end 
and. the will baa chosen the mean, so subordinated, With the ccnaequence that the 
ot10l1 of the will to the meana c alBti tutes ontologically a sing.le motion direc-
ted to ... d _brac1nc the end alao. 
lOW', a._sUm aris.8. Sine. ~e end Worms the means aa a result ot the 
operat1C1'l of reason, 1t wauld seem that a un cannot act through the virtue of 
... actual tntent:1C11 unl.sa he hael, at tbe tille ot the actual intention, fore-
.. en every one of the anns he would emplor tor t he end intended. For instance, 
ti, betON the priest begins the functions tor a partieD r ceremony, he says to 
hiluell, .'! want to pertorm these actions and 8"1' these prayers tor, this end. 
(thanksg1vmg to God),· but omits to think apllc1tl;r or the preliminaries to 
those actions .... "ld pra;ren, then he doe, not haT. a Y1nual :intention ot that end 
en he carries out the prellld.nar1es, tor example, the washing ot h1s banda 
betore he ltepS out to the place ot worah1p.:. CCI'lSequently, his washmg of hands 
will not have moral value b1 the virtue ot the' actual intention. 
In an..,.r to thie, 1t aq be noticed that there are three poI.ible situa-
t10ns to wh1ch one can appl;r the worda actin,!!!!!.! T1rtaal. .1ntentiCl'l. In the 
tiret. the agent 1a dealing with the immediate mean. to the end aetua.l.ly intend-
ed. ftte.. are the meana which :amet be ordered to the end in orcler tor t he actu-
al intention to take place at allf the actual intention 18 ot an end to which 
certain meana are ordered. fhe carrying out ot the.. _ed1at. means t 0 the 
end, theretore, when done 'by'Tirtue ot the actual 1ntentiOD., constitutes the 
t:1.nrt category, which mar be call.ed Clasa A, ot virtual intention. ~ple8 ot 
this s:1 tuat1fX1. are the following! a man who ha, just u.de up hi" mind to eat 
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.tart. making a sandwich for hilluselfJ a boy who has decided to pass a teetb,. 
cheating beSins to wr.1te out a tiny crib-note, a man .tarting to pray tor a cer-
tain tavor (1ndeliberately) begin. to think ot other things, though he cCXltinU.' 
speaking the worda of the prayer. 
The .econd aituatian occurs when a retrogressive aeries ot mean. to means 
takes place, so that the :1Jmnediate means to the end actually intended becomes 
it.eU the end ot certain Ileana, which in tum require certain media tor their 
atta1naent, and so on. Thus, a person desires to glority God (the end) by work-
ing tor people (the means). Having concretized. the means by deCiding upon a 
career in medicine, the person then decides for that end (being a doctor) to go 
to school (the means). In school, his stUdies become the end ot his daily sche-
dule, so that eating, .ocial lite, sleep, work, etc., are all ordered .. mean. 
to the end that is stud;y. low, although in each successive step tbis aapiHl1t 
to the medical profession actuall7 orders the means to the next proximate end, 
he does not have an actual intenUcn of the o,riginal. end, but is acting with a 
virtual intention of the original. end. Hence," in thi. Class B ot virtual inten-
tions, many un1 ts belcngiug to Class A appear, but eaoh unit not direotly rela-
ted to the first end in the .eries canat1tutes an instanoe of a Class B virtual 
intention of the first end. 
Thirdly, acting with a virtual intention describes the situation in which 
one makes .ome choioe lIhich, true enough, has been made tor same partioular, 
proximate end, but whioh, logically, oould also be ref'erred to 8aas further, 
lIore ultimate end. For example, it a person chooses saae aotion which aocord8 
wi th right reason (Say, eating tqperately to 0 antral hi. appetite), then he 11&7 
be said to be virtually intending his proximate end, which is his human per.tec-
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!tiem and hi. laat end adJap17, which 18 glor11)1Dg God. Conyereel1', .ere b" to 
~ODtrad1ct the dlctat .. of reaeon dellberate17, be would Yirtual.l7 be int_ding 
to renounce hi. own pertecUcn and the praise of Ood. this we of nrtuJ. in-
itentl<1l, wb:loh JIq be called Clae. 0, dU'fers froa Clau B in that the litter 
proceeda from. a pl'ft'1ou.alT placed actual 1ntcU<Il of au ult1aate end, and the 
.eriea of IINDa-eIld relat1.. retrogre •••• tr<a that end b,. an interlinldng 
oha1n. In Claa. C, the acUnt,. ea1d to be dOH With a nrtul 1ntentica doe. 
~ot proceed. .t:raa an actual 1I1tenUca ot a Jdgher end., but. 10li0all7 lead. to 
.'DOb an 1ntCUCIl. 8uara, 111 OM work, diaoue ••• thi. t1P8 ot intention aleng 
r.n th the actual, Yirtual, and hab1 'w, and cal.lat it the iDterpraUU", •• ) 
One IlUIIt noUce ~ the word Yir\ua11. not ueed :I.A the ....... in thi. 
-
third claa. I.. in the firet two. In thoee 1t meant tlbJ to:rce ot·J here 1t M8D8 
Itpot,ential17-, Juat .. 81 __ t. are 8&id to be Y1rtuall7 in the cc.poun.da and an 
act 1. aa1d to be Tlr1iull7 1n the habit. and pann • 
.&.lao, it 18 good to notioe that the di."iDcUOl'l .. de prev1OW1l7 betw .. a 
Y1rtul int_tim 11\ whloh the atteuUOD toe". on tbe uans, md one in which 
the attentiem wanders c~e~ oft \be .. t'er at hand, oan tit &117 ot the 
three olaa ... A, B, or C. ror 111 an7 action whioh pl'OOeeda trca a nrtual 1nte" 
Ucn, the Il1nd can attend or not atted, W11:hout thereb7 ohan&1ng the nature of 
the acUen. 
D.l.Y1d:1ng the three ola.... ot 'Y1r\ua1 intent!., tbln, with Clas. A and 
Cla.a. B representing cae distinct group and Cla •• C anether, it can be seen that 
the moral value' or action in ODe group 1. net detel'llined. the ._ wq &8 in the 
3 !! Ult1:llo !l!!, II, 4. 
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Regarding Class A there i. no difficult,.. Pertol'JliD.g the mean. with th 
rtu.al intention of the end hal the ... moral. Yalue aa if' the end were being 
tually intended during the operation.S In regard to Cla •• B the an ... er 1s the 
ame. Each succeeding choice andintention really .prings from and 1s directed 
o the exactly same end that was originally intended. It 1. not necessary for 
e agent to consider at the time at the actual intention all of the links in 
he chain of succeeding intentions. J'rca his desire or this end, he wants these 
eans. Wanting these, he directs his operations to the means ota tta1ning th_. 
d 80 en. Trae enough.. at any t1me he can recall if be 80 wish.s the tirst end 
€I intended and all the subseQ.uent steps, but this recall immediately link. the 
eans at hand with the original end in an actual intention, not a virtual inten-
ion. In the words of at. Thomas concereing this second category of virtual 
tention. "[O)u:nis f:i.nis a ratione deliberativ& intentus, pertinet ad boftua a-
cuiue virtutis, vel ad malum alicuius vitii. Nam hoc ipaum. quod al1Q.ui. agit 
rdinate ad sustentatiooem vel Q.u:1.etem sui corporis, ad bonum virtutis ordinatur 
" 
eo qui corpus sum orclinat ad bonum virtuti... Et idem patet in aliis_,,6 
"Sic igitur. em allquis .eipsUlll ord1nat in Deun, sicut in finem. in onnibus q'Wl 
ropter seipsUlft facit manet virtute intentio ultim1 finis. qui Dltue estt unde in 
bus meren potest, si oariutem habeat. II 7 
~ m.oral value il meant here not (Illy the speciel ot good or l?ad, but more 
elpecially the degree or grade, if this way of conceiving might be allowed, of 
oodne8. or malice_ 
5 Cf. ~ IV ~., 6, 1, 2, 1, ad 4J lS, 4, 2, J 801., and 4, ad 4. 
6 !_!., I-II, 18, 9 ad J. 
7 E! Carlt., 11, ad 2. 
About 01aaB 0, St. 1ft .... baa nothing to ., unless one dtiaire, to call 
the habitual mtentian a .ort of m:'erpretati .. mteDtian.8 'erhap. the rea_on 
i_ that the interpretative intention of u end does not have moral significaDO. 
upon huun action. !'he taAtt that, los1c~J a mara i, intending a certain aore 
ultiute end 1V intend:1n& this or that ".r.r prax1aate md doee not inltUft the 
taot that be would. intend tha.t ultimate end if he bee ... awa.re at itl It hi. 
[will. r-.ained !:1xed, then of cou.rse thatconclwCI1 tollare. Jut un are often 
"ohan&1nc the1r min.1I when they aee the lop.caJ. canaequenc.. ot their choia •• 
and intentiQQ.8. Theref'ore the only aorallt, tbat _tens into. oQlaid.eration of 
Claes C nnw. intention perta1n. to it as an an of intction of a prox1aate 
end, taken e1'Uler aa an actual intentiOll in it. ftn n,ht, or .e an inataDce of 
Clue A virtual. intction. That 18, 1t that intentiOn be in cODtOl'll1ty with 
the d:lc'kt.. of right reaBon, the in ten t.i.an i.t good J it a gainat riIht reason, 
the int_tion 1a pad.;..; 1'beretOl'8 thi.ola •• of act101l 18 judged ... units in 
~-.el.v •• , 'and not accorcl:ir.la 1;0 .mae higher ~1nt_tion which lIipt haYe beell 
elioitecl. 
CoDtol'lLi.ty to l"1aht l"Haon cClDatitute. the norm of all h~ aat1cm..10 It 
~it1.a .. 1004 or bad. e .. J'7 volunt&r1 actiao, whether external or :Internal, 
iwt&ether ot the iDtellect or of the will, whether choice, cOlmael, or 1ntenUon. t 
8Althoqh the habitul 1ataU. 1Adioat.s "hat a un baa done lut rith 
NCar<! to the ad, not what he rill do or a1ght clo. 
9!!. !!l~. 2, 2, ad 91 -[I] .. paitur aliq'" a Deo pro e. quod. tacturu 
.... t, sed pro eo quod tacit.-
lO!_I., l-1I, 18, 5 ., and 6 OJ II-II, 8, 6 OJ 47, 7 OJ 157, 2 c. 
U ot• !.!., I-II, 18, 9 0, 19, 1 ad 3_ 
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Iwvt.bele.s, :l.t 18 oOlUlected intimately with the act of mtention, tirat ot all 
beeaWl. DO a,ct act. except tor some cd, eecoru:llJ beoaue an7 action Rat be 
elther direotect or not directed to a due end.12 Icoe, lt the intentioo which 
aut precede ..,eFT actioo and whloh qualitie • ..... I'T actl00 ocmtoraa to right 
re ... on, the aoUCIl 18 good,. it against right rea.on, the action 1. «:1.1.13 
In another reIPHt alao the dictat .. of rigbt reason 0 .. to bear upon 
1I1tentian. Sinoe me Datvall7 know that they are to act in accord with rlght 
rea'«1,14 and inhlJUD action th81 rill be aware ot .. hether or not their utlen 
i. contol1l1ng to righ' rea.on, a per8em will mow .. ben his pre .. nt diapoaitien 
toward or de.1ft of a ,hin, oan1'liau with a •• ire he has previOUsly elioited. 
Thu., it a aan baa _de a lood 1ntenti01l ot a certain end, and nft, inl,dMli"l 
with the .... to that aut, :I._ oontl"Ulted. with the opportunity to direct tbe 
mean. to another cd whioh h. man i. OOl1tr&r7 to riabt rea8GB, and then oboo .... 
e. 'hi. end, that man thereb7 haa oonaciw.ll' ude ail 1n\enUan opposed to the 
, tirat •• he • de. J5 Once he ha.' dme thi. J.le no longer pertol'lla acti-. b7 
" 
Yin ... of his tirat intentlm, but now hi. cOll'1'trarr actual tntctioa nppli •• 
the torce tel" all .ub ...... t &otion. 
The torce of the orig1Dal. intent!CIl 18 broken, therefore, by at intentlcm 
of a oontr&r7 .uh by an ~tent1OA of an end oontrary to riaht reason it the 
l2lbid., 18, 9 c t Bee •••• e.t aut. quod .el ordin'tur, .,..1 non ordinetur 
ad debit,. tin_.-
1l0ood Or ft":I.l, that i., 80 tar .. 1tl moral 'f'alua in the .ye. ot Ood 1s 
concerned. Ct. !.!., I-II, 19, 8 ad 1; 21, 1 c. ' 
14 !-I-, Il-II, 47, 7 c. 
15Th1• 1. not to 11&1 that a Il8ll needa to desire the contra17 end a& 80m .. 
thing bad tor him .. lf; thi& 1s a psychological impossibility. De fer. 22, 1 ad 6 
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original 1ntentiCll'l were goodJ b;y intending an end according to right rea.on, 1£ 
1t were bad.16 On the other hand, the toree ot an original good int_t1on is 
aeral7 l'Cldered t_porar1l.7 inoperative in those ea ••• in whioh a man act. eon-
trary to riPt reason, but without being consc10us or the end. Th. un not 
haT1n, adVerted. to the end .. hi. aotion 1. CCI'ltrary to the good. end 1n t&ot,17 
while hi. will aubject;1Tel7 reaiD. t&1thtul to the end. ·[Q)uod en1m .. tur in 
peeoat ..... :l.all .. propter De_ .... tv habitu, etai non actu •• 18 "f.I]lle qui 
peeoat nm.1aJJ.ter, iDhaeret bono t8llporal.1 Dm ut trueD., quia non oonstituit 
in eo fin_. aed. lit utena, reteree in De ... nOD utu, sed hab1tu.,,19 In auoh 
instanoe. the choice baa DO aoral ww~ trca the orig1nal good 1ntmt1an, tor 
:l.t doea not tall \II1dar that 1Atentian .. but stands by 1t.elf .. an act··ot _lice. 
1ri.t17, me lo.e. pera_ent17 \he ettic .. ,. of a ,ood actual intentiCl'l b,. 
a del1beratel:y e1:1e1ted ocmtrary intenti., eIle taporar1l7 loae. :l.t. ettieac:y 
8ft pertomlq an aotian whioh objeotlTe17 oppoaalthe good _41 1nt_ded but :I.. 
ot cana:1derec:l 1n relation to the en4. ""e~io. peecat_ quod .. t ex certa 
Ua, e.t gran_ paceato quod eat _ pal.1One, quia ill. q1d. peeoat ex oerta 
Ua, eat ule d:1.pos1tue quant-ma all :l.p .. tinea, qu:1 e.t principla in 
erab1l1bua. it aic 81U1 detanus eat per1cnil.oaior quua e1uI q1d. ex pas.iODe 
oat, cu1ua propoe1tua tendit in bon_ tin., 1:1oet hoc propoaita interl'l8p6-
v ad h01"8Dl prepter pauion_.-2Q 
161 ad Cor., 14, 3 (med.). 
--
17Kutat1. mutandis if the original intention 1. a bad eme. 
185.1'., n*n, 24. 10 ad 2. 





The aoral Tuue or action performed with a TirtWll. intention, it haa beat 
.aid, or itself equal. the moral Talue ot the .... actiCll performed 'With an 
actual intention. lor what reaaon, then, doe. lit. !hCllaa seaeu.e. indicate a 
preference tor an actual intention over a T1rtual intention'ln One 81'u,..er 11es 
in the subtle infiuence or those two factors of attention and intensity.-22 In 
the Urst chapter both of these tactora were deser1bect. There it was seen hOll' 
the intena1t7 of 8D."¥ operatiCll of the eoul held \be attention captive, and hOll', 
on the other hand, att_'!m m1ght inctaoe create intcai t)" • Whatever the dit-
ticulty in d1.UapJ..h1n& between the two in a giTll1 action, it would .ean upon 
-al¥8is that the etteot ot attending to an.'. aot1aa23 i. to raise the probabi-
lit;y of Ca) recalling \he original end inteded and thus repeating the actual 
inttnt1C1'l, (b) elicit1n, other pl'ai.ewor1h7 d •• ires ... .ted by" the mean. (upon 
.. hiGh, properq, one i. actina when CDe has a virwal. intention at the end). 
lh:Ue the intellect 1. distracted there 1. li ttl. chane. ot JlBJdn! deliberate 
rnu act.. 'lb. effect of intensity would be ,to delq the gradul 1088 of the 
toro80f the actual intention and to fort1t7 oile'. present inclina.tion of the 
a •• 
21S.~ III, 64, 8 ad 3t teQwun1.. etucl1 ... OuraN debut I&CNaenti a:lni.ter 
ut aU_ aCtual. intention. adhibeat." Al.o, l! IV .!!!!i., 6, 1, 2, 1 ad 4. 
22 A. aore obYioua an_v 1. that the oI)j8Ot. wh1ch cae iIltends can make the 
act of Jntending more pertect. The h1cher the end intended, the better the 
aotul lntent1011. 8o,:lD Tirtual activity that "'817m. carri •• on dq in and 
da;y out (th. Clue» type), people are makinl numeroua actual intentions. But 
thq (the actual intentioaa), though aade b;y Tirtue ot ... preY10ue actual 
intention of a la8t end, are le •• morally Taluable thu. it the laet end were ~ 
ob3 .. t of 'tho .. intent1 •• , and not ••• praximate ends. -
23Th1a 18 of CJ.aa • .A and ala ••• Tirtual 1.ntaticn now that thi. 1 .... 1; 
to be spoken. 
will,24 thu red_ina the chanee. for a chan .. in one'. intention. fiDall)' ~ 
coune, attention wo\1ld praaote inten.lt;y and no. Tersa.25 
Reno. it 18 aore d •• irable to perlors attenu'Tel7' \h. action one ia per-
forming with a Yirtual intention, than to pertora 1 t d1etract.dl;y. lot that the 
latter po.se .... 188. aoral Talue than the t01'ller, ocml1dered a. under a Yirtul 
intention. ht in the tormer eil"Cl:1Dl8hnce the agent i. aore prepared to pertON. 
other aoral.l7 Taluable act.t and, in particular, to repeat the act of actual 
tnt_tlem, which, .1rhc repeated, u;y likel;y be u.d.e aore 1nt-ael7. 'Ja1larl;y, 
, 
it 18 80re de.irable to have an actual intention ot the end to lIhich <me i. 
di:rectinl one'. action., than to haTe merely a 'Yirlual iDtenticm. !ctim which 
is actual.ly referred to the end i. preferable to the ... action don. with a 
Y1riual intention 'beeaue ill the latter ca". on.'. cbaoe. of eont1Du.d, caple-
--tarT, cmaeqv.ent, ad reiterated utiCD. cleere..... Likew1 .. , in the atten-
tiTe ~ of action with a Yirtual tntentim the chllilc •• are great.r than in the 
diat.racted we, whil. there 1a the con.-tant:, danpr, in the di.tracted t)'pe, of 
lo.ing the tONe ot the virt\1&lintenUon alt$pther. 
It. ~au.s warn. of this danpr. "It siout Tirtu aoU.OIl1. priaae oontinue 
debU1tatur, ut quudoque lapis 1ap'tllaua qute .. at, Yel cOIltl'U'iO aoclo Ilcnatur, 
nisi :Lt ... iapellatUl", ita, ut dicit AlIIutau, 'a em. 'Yitae _aiden_ 
quodam9do tepeac1t. It ideo certi. horis ad Depti_ orandi _nt_ I'ft'ocaaua, 
24!!. III Set., 11, 2, I, ad 1. ·IDtentio aut. et d1r1g1tur et azoiutur 
et roboratur ei'lii'.,eot:Lone alic~U8 exaaplari., in quo t1n1. secundum l'OII pru-
cadat. Undo aicut 1I1tetio noatra qua intendillu8 in gloria anima., excltatur 
ex inapeet1on. div:1nae ,lona. quae •• t ex_plar Doatrae beatitud1n1a tuturaeJ 
ita ••••• 
ISIn oonneottion with thi. and the next paragraph the follOldng article. are 
eapeciall;y pt!rtin81tl S.T., I-II, 19, 8 OJ 20, 3 OJ 20. k c. 
14 
• deaider1_ QUod t.epeecere incepen:', amino trige.cat. ... 26 In the next Solu-
ian he repeate \he not.ion that ane'. at'Mntian remain • .,.1rtWlll:T in ene'. 
1'&781', ..,.en 1t in the proce.s of the pr.,.r one beoca •• di.tracted. Ha conti-
ue. wiih the caution hanTert -[1]181 tanta r1at ""agatio, quod amn1no depereat 
8 pl'1laae int.ent:1m1.. Et ideo oport.et quod frequenter h(llo 001" NYooet ad 
ae1p_ •• 17 tberaf'ore a man C6Jl be deprived ot 'the moral Yalue of .cae good 
utual 1uUctionl he oan 10" the torce ot t.he orig1Dal int_t1aa. fo prevent. 
hi. eituaUon frODl happening, and to r_ecb' it if' it ahould happen, he baa to 
renew hia act.uJ. 1ntentian • 
. Theoret1cal.ly, renewal is unneoe.dl"7. theoretically_ !bat. 1., acoording 
o the· nature of virtual intention it would .eem autf'1c1ent. tor a per.on to 1D-
tend .. e 111 bia We .. lut end ot bis _tioo., and per.f'ora trca then on &1.1 ot 
• ut1oa. dh a virt'U&l1ntention ot that end without eYer haYing to reD ... 
that ut.ual intent.lon to "uri t by it.. !hie lqpothaad.. ot cour.e i. salt-de.true 
'1"'., be.idee presupposing a man po .... sed or, preternatural power. 1'01' 11" a aan 
re natuall7 capable of g.tting alan.g .0 ...n .. not ever to .in mortal.l)r, th 
re lfOuld be no logical :re-..on wbT bit intentian would c.... to be actul dur-
in, his waking hove. lor no pa.sim. or other tactor. would prennt hi. orde~ 
i -'"%7 act cCIlacioul7 to God, and he could ... 117 attend to thi. ordering .. 
11, ha'ring .. actual. order to Ood 1n all of hi ... "1eas. Thus, the Te17 
•• ib111 '\7 ot Yinu&1 1ntenticm waald diaappear in auoh an h1P~e.u. 
Looking at un &8 he 1., theraf'ore, r8llft&l. of hi. actual intentim of hi. 
26 J! IV 1m,., lS, 4, 2, ) aol. 
21lbicl., 4 aal. 
-
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p.&st end is nece.8&1'7 tor h1Il either to restore the eubordination at hi. action 
to the laet end it that Subord1natian haa been loat, or el.. to make that ,ub-
ordination more 8011d. Renewal i8 adYantageous, al,o, tor b,.. it one reatore. 
tervor into one's action., thu adcl1ng to their moral Talue. 
The l'MIICIls why renewal i, practically necessary are aa old as man since 
Adsta'. tall. Passions, ignorance, assertion or selfish pride, the bad habit. 
consequent upon theae, etc .-they all lead a man .....,. trca actiCll consonant with 
a good actuall,.. intendedrend. -Cum aut_ aliqu:1s non utitur habitu rlrtutis ad 
IIOderandas paasiones vel operatione. propriaa, nee.sse est quod prOV'enit.nt mul-
tae paalJ1,one. et operationea praeter modm virtuU8, ex mclinatime appetitua 
sen.1UTt, et al10rum quae exter1u. lIlovent • ..28 ·(r~lllando 1n.f'eriores potentiae 
iTeheaenter atticiuntur ad sua obiecta, eonsequen. eat quod superiore. Yirel 
:lmpediantur et deord1nentur in' atds actibua. Per vitium. auts luxuriae max:1ae 
appetitua interior, scilicet eoncupiscibili., vehementer tntendit 1U0 Obiecto, 
ICmeet de1ectabili, propter vehalentiam clelactationi.. It 1deo consequens 
est quod per l'l1XUriam maxime superior •• viree "deordinentur, scilicet ratio et 
yolunt ... •29 !he very external acta which men have to perform can lead them. 
astray. -Quod autem, huiU81llodi ban. al1quis intendat ut in pluribus qu1bu. priV& 
times bali secundum rationem cO%lsequuntur, ex hoc proven1t quod plures viTUnt 
secundum sensum, eo quod aena1b1l1a aunt nobis manifesta, et magi. eff1caciter 
lIo'Vent1a 1n part1cularibus, in quib'l18 est operatio.")O As a matter or tact, in 
28 !.!., I-II, 53, 3 c. 
29!.!., II-II, 153, 5 c. Ct. also I-II, 109, 8 c. 
)O£.~.. III, 6, 
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t;he natural order wimpoaa1bUe &.t) hoarl.n_ semper vel diu in tanta vigilant1& 
Ie.", quanta ac1 hoc .nqu1ritur propter mul:\a in qui:bus mens hom:L'lis oceupatnr,.JJ 
~8re "ad hoe" refer, to the &Toidance of giVing con.ent to something 1f'h1ch w1ll 
~reak ott bi. ord1Dat1on to hi. good end. 
In the li&ht of all the .. w1ldeal. faoton, then, it 18 olear why a nan who 
want. to pertoa ao1"&ll7 l'aluab.le act. DftI.I;t rena hi. actual intenticm I both to 
rut... hi, ord1natiClO \0 hi. proper end ehould he have tallen from that ordi."la-
t1m) ad to pl"ft'Cl' b1qelt fraa approaching too clangel"OUll7 nea:r a fall. bh 
reaaal 18 bElD;8l1.1~ tor prepar1ng a .. to 1ricrease b1 •• orally valuable acta, 
it not. tbroap 1Dcreaa1ng the 1nt8'la1t;r of the repeated int81tion and the action 
tollowml, at leaat throaah the tact that two act.. ot utual int.slt1cn are 
better \haD. _. 
How ott. In int.en tlea ahould be renewed 1, neYer determined by St. Thomaa. 
aaoe, la.eYer, he .... t.o indicate the an ... r, 'but .1n real1t,. he haa only ;re.... 
pJuw,eed the pro'bl_. "It a1 quaeratur quando oporteat aotua reterre in .tinea 
11l1i1a_, .boo D1hU al1ud .~ , .. quaerere quando aportet habitua char.t.tatia ex-
11"8 1n .. tal qu1a ,_docn •• _ habitue c.bar1taUa in ICtla exit, tit ordinatio 
toU.ua hCllD.1n1. ill fill_ ulUDwa, et per oOQlquen. aanita eorum quae in ips. 
ol'tiDantur ut bou ab1.wl2 All he i. eapcg 111 that 0118 II\UIt l18ke an actual. 
intcUon of the lut eacl wh_ CIle baa to d.o .. ething aetuall7 tor that end. 
ht it -.01:Ild .... obvloua that no definite indication of tille or t11lea c. 
be Ii"" to the ..,.u<m. lirat of all, lI!l\1Ch de~ _ CIne's purpose. If the 
,ue-,1on 18 .. ow otten .houlcl a man renew aD actual intention or his la.t end in 
'iDe Ver., 24, 11 c. 
--
3!In II Sen,., 40, 1, S, ad 6. 
- -
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order to avoid loain, it. f01'Ce'," the ,eneral an ... r mut come in tem. of the 
individual f. own ,.ad paat experiellce. It "Bow otten to be perfect."" the gener-
al an_r muat ap1n caae in term. or the indiv1d.ual t • habit., occuplt1ona, viI'-
tu., taperament. Diaappointing .. euoh a geaeral an .... r mq be to ln700e 
eeekiIl, def1n1te eolutiOl'18 to _ery probl_, the tact raaina that a definite 
.olution cannot in this oaae be p.TeI1. At In:'; rate, 1t ...... not g!Tetl b)" st. 
Th .... 
this chapter, tbeD, dealing with the moral influence ot a virtual intention 
upon uUon pertor.med with a v1rtualintentica, ",an b7 noting the oontinuance 
ot the matt8J'looofom relat1onah1p .et up in the actual intention. After an expla-
natian 01 attentive and dia\r8Gted Yirtul intention, followed 'b.r a diatinction 
or thne ola .... of Y1rtualintenUon, it ....... that MUon under a true 
Y1nual iIltentiOll Cu oppoaed to :tnterpNtat:lve in_1;1on) hu the eae moral 
Talue aa .. t1011 1Ilu:ier an Mtual iIltllltion. .At th1apo1nt the dilOwud.on ot the 
iIlterpret&Uve ~ of vinual1ntmti. ledJl&t~ to a briet consideration 
of the idea of oonf01'll1t;y to right rease, whibh in tU'l"D pointed OIlt hOW'the 
:1Jltl1J.eCe of a or.l.c:tnal1atentic can c..... lext, the JIOd11)ing :tnnuenoea ot \ 
atUntian ad. :tnt_ei "7 helped to expla.1a the preferab1l1 t;y of .. actual inten-
tion OYer a 'rirtul intention, ad. of lID attentive MUon ewer a d1atracted 
.. Uan. .rinlll)", the :re .... whioh JUke renewal of an actual intention nece ... 
8&1'1 aad deairable were to\lDd in the lnaan elal_t, an anner whioh at the ... 
tt. rules out a D __ neal _anI' regard1nC the tnqv.nC7 of renewal. 
r 
A sreat deal of contueiQD. can tur!"ound the teNs ~t-t ~Wn~OD. ~ 
tenU. and 9,p.bltJ!!! i!!en'!~. !he major part IJ! the d.1t.t1Gul:G7 1n _c:le1"-
cU.na each of the thNe and in diating-cl1.nina <r1e .trc:a the 0 ......... trca 
UIIq8 of t.fmu and fl'Ql the oaapla1 ty of h1lUn at;l tion. 
!el'lll8. Tel'lU overlap. .An ac1»uaJ. 1ntmt1()lt can be habitual. (....ung cutn:.aa.I 
) md virtual intentlcn "an be habitual. fhe c .. of a .benai.' aoak who 18 
at ocmt:1n1lO'Uly uld.nc actual intention. ot a e.~ _d Ulunratea tbe 
rat 111 tuat.1cn, fIDel the cue of a holy urried man who repeat. h1a actual. 1D-
Ucm8 at ~ 1ntreq\Wl1t inte"ala Ulustrate. the I8CODd. fbe apiD, .t ...... 
1a'lenUcma ... nrtuall.7 11'1 the will 1I'h1ch baa an bab! tu.al 1r1Mott_. ...... 
Jae. the noUcm of ri.rtual in'.tlcn oan be·· ~tended to aiani1'7 what ,"-~ 
Oau.clllow an interpretative intention, but wbLeh wae no1. eo n.ed 1D 'the da7 
t It. !boua. On the ota .. 1814, •• '!hema. sOQet:imea let tbe word .,,.~ in-
01. both actual act ~18l. mtent1m. l1n&lll' j the ue of •• h phraa •• as 
,....... ........ tl1B ......... l FtowlS. c4 ~1'~ t!rl&.':*, and aven ~~~ d;t.P?fi1.UQtl, ean 
.... ~ lI1l1leacl ODe tnto • wrona oonoept.1C11 of the nature of bab1tual1nt.entlcm.. 
Partly _cour.rUn, tor th.1e overlapp1n,g 18 the cuaplexit1 of tniaanarU.OIl. 
Ul.1nc • tor 3-an actual 1n~t1co-1 •• imple enough to deacrlbe. Wi.l.l.1na f 
or. (tor Z)-a 'Ytrtv.al mtfmt1t.Z'l at Z-mvolws also an ac~U&l. 1ntcUcn ot ". 
one om pel'f'oa ! (lor. tor Z), in which cue one's actual inWn U<I1 ot \1' 
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hal ceued '.eaUil. of d1etract.cIn ••• , md. 8T.r;yth1ng i. being d.one with a Tir-
tuaJ. intention. JlII:ll7 h __ .UtIl, honver, beo .... uoh 1I0re caapl1cated. than 
tM. skel.tal piot"". IDteaUOIlII toUow OJMI uP __ oth.r 1D rapid •• c ... iCID. 
8cae ot th. _cla :lAteluted. are .ubord1Dated. to others, ... are ooordiDate thoqh 
enntall7 subordinated to lID identical high.r _el, ... are in:t_clecI toanner 
in cae ut ot the will. "'ttenUGIl c ... and gou, 1Dteaa1tJ ptOII'II and. lalter •• 
a_ all1. take into "C01II1t, 1t bee ... olear that it i. tar eui.r to know 
the nature ot tba three t7P8. of 1n*Uon tUn to be able to aq 111 a par\1ou-
lar ginn in"_ce whioh of the three t,.,.. of 1Dt.Uon i. had. 
On. probJ.-. which t ... UD~ arl ••• 1D recard. to the 81IbJ- ot Yirtual 
1Dter1t1on .CIIOeme the IIOral yala of oer\a1n MUo:n.. wb1ch ••• cOllpl.te1.7 a 
.. tter of habit. the tollGId.D, 11&7 ...,.. a. 811 ... pl., & .. _ten a oh'tU'Oh 
and &lIt .. t1calq eros •• h1uel.t and. genuflect •• Or, a blaho, Ph.iD, a crowd 
autouticall7 uk •• the e1p .t the orOla OYer th.. fald.Dg a aiwaUcn maide 
the rel1g1oaa .. ere, OIle nader. about ItlIGh. &.t .. tic gestlU"8fl u leering a 
., 
tip, OJ' ahakJ.nr, handa, or paaaing a greeting. " Do th ... aetlC1ft8 haft .oral 
ala'. nat Jd.Dd ot :lDt_tian 40ea the &pat han' 
Th. fir" aWp in an...nng the quatlOD II1gbt well be to aale wh.th.r or 
the.e utian. are .. capl.t.ly _oonecioWl u the word. autoaatio lJ\1gge.t •• 
U the naatic. are DO 1I0re than the .tbnalua ad reapGll" ftriet7, the nch 
tlO1l. can be .et aleapicle th. • atro1d.Dg of cae t. beard" which _plUl.. tor 
st. Th.u the ut. ot a JUJl .. opposed to h __ ute. But it the word autau-
ie i. Dot to b. tak_ too .V1c~, th_ the aeooad atep aaturallJ .... to be 
o ct.tera1ne whether the aoUOIl were pe.rtOZ'Md. with aD habitual or with a 't'ir-
t'tlll 1Dt_tlon. fha, bonY.r, i_ to pose a talae ,._Uoa, tor the babi'ual 
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intention has alreaclJ' be_ ruled out, _1 ••• OIle ie re.terr1ng to eOlle ad not 
.OUCht in the action it..u. the habitual iDtentiOl1 belonal to a un _til he i. 
Dot pertOl'JliD1 hUUD .t ..... in other worda, stiIIulue and reaponae reacUoua are 
done with an b.ab1tllAl intention (ot the last end, or a prox1aate ad, bU not 01 
the eel ot the aat itlelt. 1n eUatal .. md ftapGll" .. UTi .. no int-'1_ 1. 
-
utual.l7 ude). "Bab1t1ilal1ter eaUa retert in De_ et qu1111h1l q1t, nee 
aliq:l1d actual1ter 1ntend:1t.·l 
lather, it thoae ·aut .. tlo" ,"turea de.scribed in ths .u. ...... t of the 
proble involve .oae 0_801oqns.8 GIl ths part of the agat Mel thue are 80re 
tnq h--.n action, the proper qtaest:1ca Ihould be whether the acti_ 1. doI1e 
wi\h a virtual or aD _t.val. intention. Jow, aocordiBg to the detiJlit1C1l of a 
h-.. acti_, the agent JIUI1; have .. s end in view. 2 !hefttore, in tho .. 88te, 
at lead aD a nul. 1Dtantion ot .eae _d, h ..... er proxiaate, ... be present. 
It ..,. be that • v1rt.ual iDt_tion ot .GIle more ul.Uaate ad. can al.o be at~ 
buted to \h. agent. It..,. al.o be 'ru, .. aJ.reaq .ta\ed, that the agent hal 
'. an habitual. 1n'-ntion of ... di.t.ant ad, tor exaple, it the .... 11&1 1nt4lnUca. 
nre a Jd.nor 4.eord1natiOl1 trca rilbt re&8OD. But it the "aut. . tic· PtAure • 
.... at all eonaeioll,q pl .. ed, the the &pDt a118' have had ... utual inten-
ti_ whc he b8,an the. 
Another of the aaJor Fobl .. eormeo'ed with the 81lbjecrt. of iAt.ct.1on has 
- alreadiJ bee u8ll'4lred. This probl_ ask, h_ often a penCIl ehCNld rea.- hi. 
~ ~., 11, adj. That ia, "nee aliquid actuallter 1nten.dit lin Dna]. 
2a•f ., I-II, 1, ) at w(A] ctU8 die_tv hmlanl, inquant_ proced1mt a volUD-
ta's cieaberata. Ob1ec1;_ autem voluntatia eet bon_ at finia. It ideo aaDi-
featua .at quod prineipiua hlB8l1ol'Ulll actu_, inquantUII aunt h1JllUm1, eat tini •• • 
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actual intention ot the last end, the euppoe1tion being, of ooure., that an 
actual intention of the lut end 1ebetter thin a n.rtual intention of the .... 
end and certainly better than an actual intent1e1l 01 all le ... r ends. fhe an-
... r ginn preY10U8ly indioated that renewal of a good intent10n 1. neoeea&r1 
atter the good int_t1on baa been deetro;yed by an actual. 1ntantiCll of an end 
contrary to r:I.cht reaeCD, provided the person daurea to perform moral.l.1' worth-
while act.. If ell the other hand the per.em <le81re. to prevent tbe 10.. ot the 
toroe ot the actual intention, then be au.t be content, ae wae aa1d, w1 th a 
general nora. ulanew your utual intention of the l&8t end otten becaae you 
never oan tell when you II1gbt find ,-ouraelf oppoeing 1 t deUberately." How 
otten 1a otten1 How long &so 1. Ju~ in sucb phr.... ae t " ... I Jut mentioned 
above·) "Preaidelt &!lith Juet died", "I Just read acanhere"? It 1. up to the 
ind1v1dul, ha'f'1ng UDderetoed the imporlance of a riiht intent1on, the Wtq in 
whioh 1t 1s lost, and t1e reaeon. wIV 1t 1s lon, to detendne tor h1maelt what 
the word ~en will ... an in the ocr.rtext ot ~. peraoaal 11te. 
'. lIan7 other probl ... botober the aoral1.t in ccxmecUQl with the act ot in-
tention. !he .. , howeYer, peri&1n to an aepeet ot the subject whioh did not 
allow ot trea __ t in the prelent study J namel;y, the question ot a ,good or a bad 
intention. In JIaD7 wqs the probl_ which &1"1 •• trca thi, question are tar 
aor. delicate than the task of di.t1nglti..hing the three type. of intentiw, and 
perhap, thie expla1na ... the medieval philosopher-theologian, were more pr .... 
occupied with tho •• problema) 
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A. tor what CCDoem. the nature of the act ot intention, however, and the 
diUerence between each ot the three types of intention diaoueaed by St. Thomas, 
it is hoped that this study has .et all the signifioant probl.s and an .... red 
th_ nttiaiently. Or, it not, at leaat tha't1t has prori.ded the correct baaio 
analya1 • .fraa which can be drawn 'the solutions to more apee1t1o probl ... 
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